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Articles
The Risks of Copyright Infringement on
the Internet: A Practitioner's Guide
By DAVID N. WEISKOPF*
EVERY ATTORNEY SHOULD appreciate the importance of copyright
law to their clients. Because copyrighted works can be easily uploaded to
the Internet, any party owning copyrights should understand their rights
against unauthorized use of those works on the Internet. Additionally, par-
ties who maintain operations on the Internet should be informed of the risks
of liability for copyright infringement for maintaining a particular type of
Internet operation.
This article is intended to aid the practitioner in evaluating the effect of
current and likely future copyright law on the risks of copyright infringe-
ment for Internet Service Providers, Bulletin Board Operators and Web site
operators. The article evaluates the current state of copyright law as applied
to the Internet and the difficulties that courts have experienced in applying
traditional theories of copyright infringement to the Internet. Additionally,
the article analyzes current proposals to change the copyright laws, both at
the international level and in the United States Congress.
Introduction
The Internet1 has become an increasingly popular means of communi-
cation among the general public and commercial enterprises alike. As use
* Mr. Weiskopf is an Associate in the Intellectual Property Group, Fenwick & West, Palo
Alto, CA; J.D., University of San Francisco School of Law, 1998; B.A., University of California
at San Diego, 1994.
1. "The Internet is an international network of interconnected computers." Reno v. Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2334 (1997). Thus,
"The Internet today is a worldwide entity whose nature cannot be easily or simply de-
fined. From a technical definition, the Internet is the 'set of all interconnected IP net-
works'-the collection of several thousand local, regional, and global computer
networks interconnected in real time via the TCP/IP Internetworking Protocol suite."
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1365 n.2
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (quoting DANIEL P. DERN, THE INTERNET GUIDE FOR NEW USERS 16 (1994)); see
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of the Internet and the World Wide Web2 has increased, so too have the
legal disputes concerning activities that involve use of these networks. The
analysis and outcomes of many legal issues, such as defamation, 3 free
speech 4 and jurisdiction 5 in this context are complicated because some or
R. Carter Kirkwood, Comment, When Should Computer Owners Be Liable for Copyright Infringe-
ment by Users?, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 709, 712 (1997).
A computer network is made up of three primary building blocks: computers, software,
and telecommunication lines. Most networks consist of "server" computers, where in-
formation is stored, reproduced, and controlled, and "client" computers, that customers
use to "dial into" or access the information on the servers. Software both enables a
computer to function and permits the computer owner to control how that computer is
used .... [T]elecommunication lines connect computers and make it possible to transfer
information from one computer to another.
Id.
2. See Mitchell Zimmerman & David L. Hayes, Copyright in the Digital Electronic Envi-
ronment, § III (visited Jan. 28, 1998) <http://www.fenwick.com/pub/mz-copy.html> (defining the
World Wide Web by stating: "The World Wide Web, sometimes referred to as the 'graphical' part
of the [I]nternet, is that sub-set of sites and supporting facilities which utilize certain technical
protocols that facilitate the transmission of graphical and other content and support a simple,
friendly, browseable, graphical user interface"); see also Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2335.
The best known category of communication over the Internet is the World Wide Web,
which allows users to search for and retrieve information stored in remote computers, as
well as, in some cases, to communicate back to designated sites. In concrete terms, the
Web consists of a vast number of documents stored in different computers all over the
world .... The Web is thus comparable, from the readers' viewpoint, to both a vast
library including millions of readily available and indexed publications and a sprawling
mall offering goods and services.
Id.
3. See Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1996) (immunizing Internet Ser-
vice Providers from tort liability for postings made by their service's subscribers); see also Zeran
v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting that Congress created a tort
immunity for Internet Service Providers in the Communications Decency Act because "It would
be impossible for service providers to screen each of their millions of postings for possible
problems"). But see 47 U.S.C. § 230(d)(2) (providing that the tort immunity does not limit or
expand any law pertaining to intellectual property); Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F.
Supp. 135, 140-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that a Bulletin Board System ("BBS") was more like
a "distributor" than a "publisher" where it exercised little control over content on its service, and
was, thus, liable only for defamatory statements on its system where it knew or should have
known of the presence of these statements).
4. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2351 (invalidating portions of the Communications Decency
Act); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 964 n.9 (C.D. Cal.
1997) ("Internet users may also have a free speech interest in non-infringing uses of domain
names that are similar or identical trademarks."); American Civil Liberties Union v. Miller, 977 F.
Supp. 1228, 1233 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (invalidating as overbroad a statute that criminalized certain
uses of trademarks on the Internet by persons other than the trademark owner because the statute
would have prohibited "use of trade names or logos in non-commercial educational speech, news,
and commentary-a prohibition with well-recognized First Amendment problems").
5. See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd
126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997) (dismissing plaintiffs claims due to lack of personal jurisdiction over
out-of-state defendant, holding defendant's Web site activities alone did not subject the out-of
state defendant to personal jurisdiction under both the forum state's long-arm statute and Due
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all of the activities engaged in have taken place on digital networks. Courts
are beginning to establish legal precedents for these areas. However, the
courts, national legislature and international organizations are still exper-
iencing difficulty in tackling the complex issues that the Internet creates for
copyright law.
The Internet's very nature creates enormous legal issues relating to
copyright law. Much of the material found on the Internet is subject matter
protected by the copyright laws of the United States. 6 Today, technology
allows not only simple text to be accessed, uploaded and downloaded
7
through the Internet, but also allows users to do the same with pictures,
movies, software, musical works, multimedia works and audiovisual works.
These types of works are unquestionably protected in traditional tangible
mediums 8 (such as books, compact discs, paintings and film), and any
copying (or violation of any of the other exclusive rights of copyright own-
ers)9 of them would clearly constitute copyright infringement under federal
law. 10 It is not as clear, however, whether such works are similarly pro-
tected in the digital, online environment.
Determining whether a "copy" of a protected work has been made, or
whether infringement of any of the copyright holder's other exclusive rights
has occurred in tangible mediums is relatively straightforward. However, in
the digital environment, courts and commentators continue to debate and
disagree as to whether data transmitted through the various nodes" of the
Process of the Fourteenth Amendment). But see Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F.
Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996) (finding out-of-state defendant subject to personal jurisdiction based
on defendant's Web site activities). See also CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th
Cir. 1996) (finding personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendant based on relations between
defendant and plaintiff).
6. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994) (defining protectable subject matter of copyright).
7. See Mary Ann Shulman, Comment, Internet Copyright Infringement Liability: Is an On-
line Access Provider More Like a Landlord or a Dance Hall Operator?, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 555, 558 n.15 (1997) ("'Uploading/downloading' are terms in the Internet lexicon. Upload-
ing refers to the transfer of information from a user's personal computer to a computer network,
usually via a bulletin board, while downloading refers to the transfer of information from a bulle-
tin board of the Internet to one's personal computer.").
8. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (identifying protectable subject matter of copyright); 17 U.S.C.
§ 106(l)-(5) (1994) (defining the copyright holder's exclusive rights in the copyrighted work).
9. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(5).
10. See id.
11. See David L. Hayes, The Coming Tidal Wave of Copyright Issues on the Internet, § I
(visited Jan. 27, 1998) <http://www.fenwick.com/pub/wave.html> [hereinafter Hayes, Tidal
Wave] (discussing issues of copyright validity and infringement on the Internet).
Under current technology, information is transmitted through the Internet using a tech-
nique known broadly as "packet switching." Specifically, data to be transmitted through
the network is broken up into smaller units or "packets" of information, which are in
effect labeled as to their proper order. The packets are then sent through the network as
discrete units, often through multiple different paths and often at different times. As the
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networks comprising the World Wide Web is "copied" for purposes of the
Copyright Act. 12 Even if one assumes that a "copy" has been made, deter-
mining where that copy actually exists in the network may prove extremely
difficult.13 Thus, determining whether the "copy" has then been distributed
or displayed publicly becomes difficult. 14 Additionally, once one concludes
that a copy has been made and exists in digital form somewhere on the
computer network, that digital copy may be considered a derivative work,5
of the original, tangible copy, thereby violating another exclusive right of
packets are released and forwarded through the network, each "router" computer makes
a temporary (ephemeral) copy of each packet and transmits it to the next router accord-
ing to the best path available at that instant, until it arrives at its destination. The pack-
ets, which frequently do not arrive in sequential order, are then "reassembled" at the
receiving end into proper order to reconstruct the data that was sent. Thus, only certain
subsets (packets) of the data being transmitted are passing through the [Random Access
Memory ("RAM")] of a node computer at any given time, although a complete copy of
the transmitted data may be created and/or stored at the ultimate destination computer,
either in the destination computer's RAM, on its hard disk, or in portions of both.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
12. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(5); Triad Sys. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1335
(9th Cir. 1995) (following MAI, and finding likelihood of success on copyright infringement claim
because defendants "copied" plaintiff's software in RAM when servicing computers); MAI Sys.
Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518-19 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that loading of data
into the RAM of a computer constitutes "copying" for purposes of infringement under the Copy-
right Act because it remains in RAM long enough to be perceived); Advanced Computer Servs. v.
MAI Sys., 845 F. Supp. 356, 364 (E.D. Va. 1994) (loading software program from computer's
hard drive into RAM was copying under Copyright Act); see also Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software,
Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 260 (5th Cir. 1998) ("the act of loading a program from a medium of storage
into a computer's memory creates a copy of the program"); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula
Int'l, 594 F. Supp. 617, 621 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (copying a program into RAM creates a temporary
fixation); 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.08[A][1], at
8-118 (1998) (suggesting RAM copies are fixed); INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE WORKING
GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RiGHTs, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL IN-
FORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 65-66 (Sept. 1995) <http://www.uspto.gov /web/offices/com/doc/
ipniilawcopy.pdf> [hereinafter WHITE PAPER] (asserting that reproductions in RAM of computers
were already "reproductions" that copyright owners were entitled to control by means of the re-
production right under existing U.S. law). But see 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994) (stating copyright
protection subsists only in works fixed in a "tangible medium"); NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-Am.,
Inc., 45 F.3d 231 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding access by defendant of plaintiffs software did not
constitute reproduction to be a "copy" under Copyright Act); Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo
of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding audiovisual images not a "copy" for
purposes of the Copyright Act because derivative works displayed did not have sufficient "form"
or "permanence" to be deemed "embodied" in any form); H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 19 (1976)
(using storage in computer memory as an example of what should not be considered a copy under
the Copyright Act).
13. See Hayes, Tidal Wave, supra note 11, § II.A.
14. See id.
15. Although an "unfixed" work may constitute an unlawful derivative work, this paper will
limit its discussion to "fixed" derivative works. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(2) (1994).
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the copyright holder.' 6 To further complicate the problem, even if one de-
termines that uploading or downloading a work in digital form does not
constitute the making of a "copy" for purposes of the Copyright Act, two
treaties recently adopted by the World Intellectual Property Organization
("WIPO") 17 create a new exclusive right of transmission of a copyrighted
work.' 8 While arguably leaving unsettled the question of whether transitory
images of data stored in RAM 19 are "copies" for purposes of infringement,
the new right of communication to the public is potentially broader than the
existing rights of reproduction, display, performance, distribution and im-
portation under United States Copyright law.20 Consequently, any use of
the Internet potentially violates another's copyrights in some way. Because
of the widespread use of the Internet by the public and commercial sectors,
it is likely that your client will, at some point in the near future, ask you for
advice concerning Internet copyright infringement risks-either as an al-
leged infringer themselves or as one claiming another has infringed their
rights.
Your client's concerns will likely center on liability for infringement.
As a finding of infringement will likely lead to monetary damages, 2' the
16. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(l)-(5) (1994) (defining the copyright holder's exclusive rights in
the copyrighted work).
17. See infra Part V.B.
18. See infra Part V.B.
19. "RAM" is the acronym for a computer's random access memory.
20. See infra Part V.B; Hayes, Tidal Wave, supra note 11, § II.A.3.(a).
21. See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (1994). The copyright owner has the election to recover either: (a)
the copyright owner's actual damages plus any additional profits of the infringer; or (b) statutory
damages. See id. Thus, where actual damages are difficult to ascertain, or generally uncertain,
statutory damages are nonetheless recoverable. This election is especially important on the In-
ternet, where actual damages are likely impossible to calculate. Section 504(c)(1) (1994) provides
for statutory damages, allowing recovery "in a sum of not less than $500 or more than $20,000"
for each act of infringement, as the court considers just. See id. Additionally, where infringement
is "willful," "the court in its discretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of
not more than $100,000 [per act of infringement]." Id. § 504(c)(2).
Statutory damages are not specifically discussed elsewhere in this article. However, clients
should be informed of the ambiguity as well as the potential for large damages resulting from
§ 504. In Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Sanfilippo, No. 97-0670-IEG(LSP), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5125, at *12-21 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 1998), the court found the defendant liable for $3,737,500 in
statutory damages for uploading infringing pictures of the plaintiff's copyrighted works to the
defendant's Web site. Plaintiffs had requested statutory damages of $285,240,000, based on the
7,475 images defendant unlawfully copied to his Web site. The case is important for two reasons.
First, it shows that statutory damage awards can be incredibly high, both in final award as well as
initial request. Second, the case recognized the ambiguity in § 504(c)(1) as to whether each "act"
of infringement constituted each copied picture, or each copiedfile containing numerous pictures.
Section 504(c)(1) provides for statutory damages "for all infringements involved in the action,
with respect to any one work." 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). Section 504(c)(1) further provides "for
purposes of this subsection, all the parts of a compilation or derivative work constitute one work."
See id.
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question will become who should be liable for the infringement. Theoreti-
cally, since copyright infringement is a strict liability tort,22 not requiring
any intent or knowledge for infringement, many parties may be deemed
infringers.
To take the simplest example, when someone uploads a picture onto a
Web site, many people, not just one, will likely visit the site. Because each
visit to a Web site results in the downloading of copyrighted material to the
viewer's hard disk,23 each visit or "hit" to the Web site potentially consti-
tutes a new infringement of one or more exclusive rights of the copyright
owner. Thus, there are potentially hundreds, thousands or even millions of
infringers as a result of one infringing work posted to the Internet. How-
ever, imposing liability on any or all of these visitors may be practically
impossible. Indeed, because people can operate with almost complete ano-
nymity in cyberspace, 24 identifying infringers can be difficult. 25 Addition-
The court found that copying each picture was a separate act, stating that "the Court finds
that each one of [plaintiffs images, copied by defendant] had an 'independent economic value'
and is viable on its own. . . .Furthermore, each image represents a singular and copyrightable
effort concerning a particular model, photographer, and location. The fact that many of these
images appeared together should not detract from the protection afforded to each individual ef-
fort." Sanfilippo, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *18-19.
Clients and attorneys, therefore, should understand the ease with which multiple acts of in-
fringement can occur, and the likelihood that large statutory damage awards will be requested, in
the digital environment. See, e.g., Sanfilippo, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4773 (granting plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment and statutory damage award).
22. See MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 9.2, at 5-6 (2d ed. 1995)
(discussing the prima facie case for copyright infringement).
23. See Hayes, Tidal Wave, supra note I1, § II.A.1.
To illustrate the number of interim "copies," in whole or in part, that may be made when
transmitting a work through the Internet, consider the example of downloading a picture
from a Web site. During the course of such transmission, no less than seven interim
copies of the picture may be made: the modem at the receiving and transmitting com-
puters will buffer each byte of data, as will the router, the receiving computer itself (in
RAM), the Web Browser, the video decompression chip, and the video display board.
These copies are in addition to the one that may be stored on the recipient computer's
hard disk.
Id. (citations omitted).
24. See Ian C. Ballon, Pinning the Blame in Cyberspace: Towards a Coherent Theory for
Imposing Vicarious Copyright, Trademark and Tort Liability for Conduct Occurring over the
Internet, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 729, 733-34 n.10 (1996) (distinguishing likely ano-
nymity for users of e-mail from users of the Internet).
25. See id. But see EDWARD A. CAVAZOS & GAVINO MORIN, CYBERSPACE AND THE LAW
(1994) (noting that anonymous file transfer protocols ("FrPs") may not be truly anonymous); Eric
Goldman, The Intellectual Property Renaissance in Cyberspace: Why Copyright Law Could Be
Unimportant on the Internet, § III.C. (visited Jan. 27, 1998) <http://www.cooley.com/scripts/arti-
cle.ixe?id=ar_1504> (noting that "there is a built-in limitation to the scope and size of anonymous
actions, particularly if any element of the activity is commercial; at a certain point the activity
should become large enough to leave at least shreds of evidence, both in physical space and
cyberspace, sufficient to allow attribution").
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ally, physically locating the accused violator can be impossible, even if one
could determine their "cyberspace address. '26 Because traditional geo-
graphic boundaries are not present in cyberspace, difficult questions of ju-
risdiction may also arise and may prohibit, or at the very least make
difficult, the bringing of a suit in many circumstances. Additionally, many
Internet users may not have sufficient economic resources to satisfy large
judgments or justify the effort and expense in locating and bringing suit
against them. 27 Is it practical or effective to sue one infringer but not the
other hundreds or thousands of infringers? In sum, while somebody will
have to pay for copyright infringements, who should be liable has become a
hotly contested point.
Three classes of Internet users appear to be emerging upon which lia-
bility is being regularly imposed for copyright infringement on the Internet.
These include: (1) Internet Service Providers ("ISPs")-which include the
sub-classes of "access providers" 28 and "content providers"; 29 (2) Bulletin
Board Operators ("BBOs"); 30 and (3) Web site operators. 31 All of these
26. The particular location of that person's computer on the Internet.
27. See Ballon, supra note 24, at 734-35.
[M]any Internet users are not "deep pockets." ... Given the relatively low costs of
access ... Internet tortfeasors and infringers thus are likely to include a high percentage
of students and others who may not have the resources to satisfy judgments .... Online
infringers and tortfeasors are more likely to be effectively "judgment proof," because
their conduct is undertaken anonymously, or they are too young or poor to satisfy a
damages award, or are located beyond the jurisdiction of a convenient and economical
U.S. venue for litigation.
Id.
28. See Shulman, supra note 7, at 559 n.26. "An access provider is a company that leases the
use of its computer facilities to connect a subscriber to a regional network linked to the Internet."
Id. (citations omitted). Access providers, therefore, are the "on-ramp" to the information
superhighway.
29. Distinguished from pure access providers, some operations provide both access and con-
tent. Thus, a commercial online service, such a America Online "offers proprietary content-based
services through its own private computer network .... Content services may include news sto-
ries, original articles, shopping information, or sports scores and weather information automati-
cally updated from a wire service. Other services may include operating bulletin boards, hosting
chat groups, or setting up interactive discussion forums." Id. (citations omitted).
30. See id. at 558 n.16.
An electronic bulletin board system ("BBS") is an online service that allows subscribers
(free or for a fee) to exchange electronic messages ("e-mail"), text, computer programs,
photographs, music and other forms of information. A user simply uploads material
from her computer onto the bulletin board. All subscribers have access to all bulletin
board messages, and any subscriber may download the material to her own computer.
Bulletin boards may be subject specific. The electronic bulletin board is one of the most
popular services available through the Internet and other computer networks .... More
than 70,000 bulletin board systems are estimated in operation worldwide . . . . The
largest bulletin board systems operated by commercial online services such as America
Online, CompuServe, Microsoft Network, and Prodigy, together have over twelve mil-
lion subscribers.
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parties arguably infringe other's copyrights, and are each therefore arguably
liable for copyright infringement. However, commentators and courts have
debated over which legal theory correctly imposes liability on them.
Have these parties directly copied, thereby making them "direct" in-
fringers? If not, are they liable under the theories of contributory32 or vica-
rious33 liability? Advising clients as to the risks associated with their
particular Internet operation will aid them in understanding their potential
liability and better enable them to create business plans in light of those
risks.
This paper is intended to help the practitioner evaluate the risks associ-
ated with the three types of Internet operations noted above in light of cur-
rent and likely future copyright law. Part I briefly summarizes how
copyright law has changed and adapted to new and emerging technologies
that have stretched the boundaries and application of the law. Part II re-
views the traditional theories of copyright infringement and the context in
which those theories evolved. This section will also compare the relative
ease (or difficulty) afforded the copyright owner by the three theories for
proving liability. Part III explores the difficulties the courts have exper-
ienced applying these theories of liability to the digital environment, and
the Internet in particular. Part IV will analyze the defense of "fair use" as
Id. (citations omitted).
See Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Law and Social Dialogue on the Information Superhighway:
The Case Against Copyright Liability of Bulletin Board Operators, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
345, 347 n.5 (1995). "BBSs are accessible to subscribers (free or for a fee) through telephone lines
and modems, or through public data networks, such as Tymnet or the Internet .... BBSs may run
on personal computers connected by modem to a telephone line, or thorough the Internet, such as
a BBS operated on USENET." Id. (citations omitted); see CAVAZOS & MORIN, supra note 25.
Like their larger cousins, the on-line services, BBSs allow users to set up accounts on
remote systems and access some basic system features. The distinction between large
BBSs in existence and the on-line services is often hard to see. The vast majority of
BBSs in existence, however, are operated on small personal computers with a single
phone line, and have a relatively small number of users. More often than not, there are
no access charges since the system operator, or sysop, is running the board as a hobby.
Id.
31. See Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2335 (1997).
In concrete terms, the Web consists of a vast number of documents stored in different
computers all over the world. Some of these documents are simply files containing
information. However, more elaborate documents, commonly known as Web "pages,"
are also prevalent. Each has its own address-'rather like a telephone number.' Web
pages frequently contain information and sometimes allow the viewer to communicate
with the page's (or "site's") author.... Access to most Web pages is freely available,
but some allow access only to those who have purchased the right from a commercial
provider.
Id. at 2335 (citations omitted).
32. See infra Part II.B.
33. See infra Part II.C.
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applied to the Internet and why such a defense does not provide adequate
security for clients. Part V discusses proposed solutions at the national and
international levels including various proposed legislative changes and the
WIPO treaty. Finally, Part VI synthesizes the above sections, analyzing
how both current law and proposed legislative changes will affect these
three categories of Internet users.
I. Copyright Law and New Technologies
A. The Goals of Copyright Law
Protecting the copyright owner or author is only a secondary concern
of United States copyright law. 34 Copyright laws primarily strive to protect
and foster the benefits received by society and the public at large from the
creativity of authors. 35 To this end, copyright law grants copyright owners
and authors exclusive rights in their original and creative works. These ex-
clusive rights protect the owners' potential proprietary interest and eco-
nomic benefits resulting from their creativity and originality. 36
Consequently, authors feel secure in continuing to create and bestow their
creative fruits upon society.
Achieving copyright law's primary goal "To promote the progress of
science,' 37 requires a constant balancing of society's interest in enhanced
34. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The copyright law, like the patent stat-
utes, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration."); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). The Court states:
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor primar-
ily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by
which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the crea-
tive activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow
the public access to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive
control has expired.
Id.
See H.R. Rep. No. 60-2222, at 7 (1909). Commenting on the Copyright Act of 1909, the
legislature states:
Not primarily for the benefit of the author, but primarily for the benefit of the public,
such [copyrights] are given. Not that any particular class of citizens, however worthy,
may benefit, but because the policy is believed to be for the benefit of the great body of
people, in that it will stimulate writing and invention to give some bonus to authors and
inventors.
Id.
35. See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219 ("The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering
Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort
by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and
inventors in science and useful arts.").
36. See id.
37. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. "Science" refers to "the arts," not science as understood
today (i.e. not physics, chemistry, etc.). See LEAFFER, supra note 22, § 2.1, fn.3.
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public welfare through the creation of original and creative works and the
free dissemination of knowledge 38 against the appropriate level of protec-
tion the law should afford authors and owners to ensure adequate incentives
for sufficient creative progress. Technological progress and development
has prompted Congress 39 and the courts to repeatedly modify and amend
copyright laws in an effort to maintain this balance.40 The new technology
of the Internet will almost certainly prompt Congress and the courts to
again amend and modify existing copyright laws to maintain the appropri-
ate balance of interests between society and authors.
B. Evolution and Change of Copyright Law in Response to New
Technologies
Legislatures and courts have not been afraid to change the level of
protection afforded authors of creative works in response to technological
38. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). There the Court
found that:
The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly, like the limited copy-
right duration required by the Constitution, reflects a balance of competing claims upon
the public interest: Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motiva-
tion must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature,
music, and the other arts.
Id.
See H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 7 (1909). Commenting on the Copyright Act of 1909, the
report states:
In enacting a copyright law Congress must consider ... two questions: First, how much
will the legislation stimulate the producer and so benefit the public, and, second, how
much will the monopoly granted be detrimental to the public? The granting of such
exclusive rights, under the proper terms and conditions, confers a benefit upon the pub-
lic that outweighs the evils of the temporary monopoly.
Id.
See also LEAFFER, supra note 22 (discussing the goals of copyright law as embodied in the
constitutional language).
39. The United States Constitution empowers Congress to grant protection, through legisla-
tion, for copyrights and patents, stating that Congress shall have the power "To promote the Pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
40. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429-31 (1984).
As the text of the Constitution makes plain, it is Congress that has been assigned the
task of defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted to authors or
to inventors in order to give the public appropriate access to their work product. Because
this task involves a difficult balance between the interest of authors and inventors in the
control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one hand, and society's
competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the other
hand, patent and copyright statutes have been amended repeatedly.
Id. at 429; see also Aiken, 422 U.S. at 156 ("When technological change has rendered its literal
terms ambiguous, the Copyright Act must be construed in light of [its] basic purpose.").
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changes. 41 Indeed, copyright law originated because of technological inno-
vation-the invention of the printing press.42 Like the Internet today, the
invention of the printing press introduced the world to the ability to mass
reproduce and disseminate creative material. While the technology's poten-
tial excited many, Parliament was persuaded to pass the Statute of Anne-
the first copyright act-in 1710 to attempt to control and limit otherwise
uncontrolled and unmonitored reproduction of written works. 43
Importantly, the drafters of the United States Constitution adopted the
basic premise supporting the promulgation of the copyright laws embodied
in the Statute of Anne.44 The United States Supreme Court has interpreted
the constitutional language and supporting policy to mandate that United
States laws adapt in response to technological change and innovation to
ensure adherence to the underlying goals of the copyright laws. 45 In the 200
years since Congress passed the first copyright act in 1790,46 technological
innovation and advancement has required Congress to continually amend
the copyright laws.47
The Internet poses yet another technological leap stretching the appli-
cability of existing copyright law. Congress' long history of amending
copyright laws in reaction to technological innovation strongly suggests that
Congress will eventually amend the statutory copyright laws to respond to
new issues created by the Internet.
41. See Brian A. Carlson, Balancing the Digital Scales of Copyright Law, 50 SMU L. REv.
825, 828-44 (discussing the influence of technology on the development of copyright law, includ-
ing discussion of statutory and case law changes in copyright law in reaction to technological
innovation).
42. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 430.
43. See LEAFFER, supra note 22, § 1.2 (discussing the reasons underlying the adoption of
protection in the Statute of Anne).
44. See id.; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See generally Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 208-14
(1954) (providing historical overview of copyright statutes).
45. See Aiken, 422 U.S. at 156 (citing United States Supreme Court decisions that mandate
and explain the need for change and amendment in the copyright laws according to technological
change). But see LEAFFER, supra note 22, § 1.3. "The Patent and Copyright Clause was adopted in
final form without debate in a secret proceeding on September 5, 1787. As a result, little is known
about what the Framers had in mind in drafting this particular constitutional clause or about the
scope of the various terms of the constitutional language." Id. (citing Ralph Oman, The Copyright
Clause: "A Charter for a Living People," 17 U. BALT. L. REV. 99, 103 (1987)).
46. See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790) (current version at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101-1101 (1996)).
47. See Carlson, supra note 41, at 828-44 (discussing the influence of technology on the
development of copyright law, including discussion of statutory and case law changes in copyright
law in reaction to technological innovation).
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II. Traditional Theories of Copyright Infringement
Copyright infringement occurs anytime a party violates one or more of
the copyright owner's exclusive rights granted by the copyright laws. 48 The
party whom themselves completes the infringing copying is directly liable
under the statutory language of the 1976 Act.49 In addition, the courts have
articulated rules augmenting the statutory language by also imposing liabil-
ity, in certain circumstances, on parties who themselves do not actually per-
form the infringing activities, but who are "related" to the direct infringer.50
Because copyright infringement is a particular species of tort, one should
not be surprised that the courts have adopted the theories of contributory
and vicarious liability-theories developed in tort law-as a means of ex-
panding the net of liability for unlawful acts.
The doctrines of contributory and vicarious liability considerably ease
the owner's ability to find some party upon whom liability can be placed.
Because, as noted earlier, the nature of the Internet may result in hundreds,
thousands or even millions of direct copyright infringers-many or all of
which may be anonymous, "judgment proof," or "small timers"-contribu-
tory and vicarious liability become important tools for the copyright owner
in the online context. Importantly, the doctrines result in the inclusion of
48. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
Subject to sections [sic]107 through 120, the owner of copyright under this title has the
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted
work publicly, and
in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a
digital audio transmission ....
Id.
See LEAFFER, supra note 22, § 9.1 ("Thus, to infringe, the defendant must have reproduced,
adapted, distributed, publicly performed, or publicly displayed the copyrighted work in an un-
privileged way.").
49. See LEAFFER, supra note 22, § 9.1.
50. See id. § 9.20.
Although not expressly recognized in the 1976 Act, a person can be liable as a related
defendant for the infringing activity of another. . . . [T]he term 'related defendants'
refers to all situations where one can be held liable for the acts of another, including
vicarious liability and liability for contributory infringement.
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particular, additional parties in the net of liability who may be more practi-
cally or desirably pursued in an infringement suit.
The client is not likely to care which theory enables them to sue an
infringer or which theory results in their own liability for the alleged in-
fringement. The copyright attorney, however, should recognize that impor-
tant differences exist between the levels of proof required to sustain valid
copyright infringement claims under each of the three theories.
A. Direct Infringement
Direct copyright infringement occurs anytime a party violates one of
the copyright owner's five exclusive rights granted under copyright law.5'
Successfully proving direct copyright infringement requires a copyright
owner to prove: (1) ownership of a valid copyright in the allegedly in-
fringed work; (2) that the defendant "copied" 52 the work, thereby infringing
one or more of the owner's exclusive rights; and (3) that this copying was
improper under the copyright laws. 53 In short, if a copyright owner can
satisfy these three criteria, the copyright owner can at least hold the party
actually completing the copying liable for copyright infringement.
Importantly, direct copyright infringement is a strict liability tort.54
Thus, any party who engages in the unauthorized exercise of any of the
copyright holder's exclusive rights is liable for copyright infringement
under federal law, regardless of whether that party knew or intended to
51. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1994) (providing that "Anyone who violates any of the exclu-
sive rights of the copyright owner ... is an infringer of the copyright...").
52. See S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1085 n.3 (9th Cir. 1989) ("'Copying' is
shorthand for the infringing of any of the copyright owner's five exclusive rights .... ); see also
LEAFFER, supra note 22, § 9.3, at 286 n.3 ("The term 'copying' is a misnomer. The reproduction,
adaptation and even performance rights involve copying in one way or another. But the term
'copying' covers unlawful distribution and display as well, hardly acts of copying as one might
use the term in ordinary language.").
53. See LEAFFER, supra note 22, § 9.2.
54. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1994); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication
Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1367 n.10 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (noting copyright law's strict liability
nature). Comparatively, and relevant to understanding differences in activities engaged in online,
defamation is not a strict liability tort. See Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1996)
(immunizing Internet Service Providers from tort liability for postings made by their service's
subscribers); see also Zeran v. American Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting
that Congress created a tort immunity for Internet Service Providers in the Communications De-
cency Act because "It would be impossible for service providers to screen each of their millions of
postings for possible problems"). But see 47 U.S.C. § 230(d)(2) (1998) (providing that the tort
immunity does not limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property); Cubby, Inc. v.
CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that BBS was more like a
"distributor" than a "publisher" where it exercised little control over content on its service, and
was, thus, liable only for defamatory statements on its system where it knew or should have
known of the presence of the statements).
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violate the copyrights of the work's owner.55 Indeed, a party can even be
liable for direct copyright infringement for unconscious copying of an-
other's protected work,56 as well as for "innocent" copying.57
While the strict liability nature of the tort alleviates the need for offer-
ing difficult-to-obtain evidence of intent or knowledge, direct evidence of
copying is rarely available. 58 In recognition of this evidentiary dilemma, a
plaintiff may prove direct infringement by circumstantial evidence, where
direct evidence of copying is not available by showing that: (1) the defend-
ant had access to the allegedly infringed work; and (2) the defendant's al-
legedly infringing work is "substantially similar" 59 to the plaintiff's
copyrighted work.60
In sum, direct copyright infringement offers the copyright owner the
ability to hold a particular party liable without any proof of intent, volition
or knowledge on their part. Its drawback, however, is that direct copyright
infringement inherently applies to only one party at a time. That is, the
plaintiff must prove the requisite copying for each alleged direct infringer
and each alleged direct infringement. Consequently, holding a large and
anonymous pool of alleged infringers directly liable is impracticable and
often impossible. Thus, while plaintiffs are still attempting to impose direct
liability on online service providers, they are also turning to the alternative
theories of contributory and vicarious liability to impose liability on the
55. See Religious Tech. Ctr., 907 F. Supp. at 1367 ("Direct infringement does not require
intent or any particular state of mind, although willfulness is relevant to the award of statutory
damages."); see also 17 U.S.C. § 504(c).
56. See Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y.
1976), aff'd sub nom., ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir.
1983) (finding George Harrison, a former member of the music group The Beatles, subcon-
sciously copied another, earlier successful song).
57. "Innocent" copying would include, for example, innocently receiving an e-mail message
that infringes the copyrights of another, and then subsequently printing that e-mail message to
hard-copy form. Further, if storage of images in RAM of a computer is determined to be "copy-
ing" for purpose of the Copyright Act, then simply browsing the Internet would constitute a form
of "innocent" infringement. See Hayes, Tidal Wave, supra note 11, § II.A.4 (discussing innocent
infringement).
58. See LEAFFER, supra note 22, § 9.3. Evidence of direct copying is:
rarely available, for obvious reasons. First, seldom will a defendant admit to copying a
work. Second, copying is often carried out secretly or accomplished by non-physical
means, e.g., from memory. As a result, few plaintiffs are able to produce a witness who
can testify that he saw the defendant physically copying the work.
Id.
59. See id. (noting that "substantial similarity" in this context refers to "similarities between
the works probative of copying [by the defendant]") (citing Alan Latman, "Probative Similarity"
as Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some Myths in Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 1187 (1990)).
60. See id. (discussing proof of copying through circumstantial evidence).
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online service providers rather than the millions of individual direct
infringers.
B. Contributory Infringement
The Copyright Act does not in so many words subject a person to
liability for an infringement committed by another. 61 The absence of such
express statutory language does not, however, preclude a court from impos-
ing liability on parties "related" to the direct infringer, 62 who have not
themselves directly infringed another's copyrights. Similar to other areas in
the law, courts have long recognized contributory copyright infringement as
a viable theory for identifying the circumstances in which it is "just" or
"fair" to hold one party responsible for the actions of another. 63 Contribu-
tory infringement extends the net of liability beyond simply the direct in-
fringer to impose liability equally on parties who are, under the
circumstances, justly accountable for the infringement. 64
The courts have defined the circumstances in which one party may be
held accountable for the copyright violations of another under a theory of
contributory infringement to be where: (1) direct copyright infringement
has occurred; (2) a party induces, causes or materially contributes to the
infringing activity of another; 65 and (3) that party also knows or has reason
to know that the subject matter at issue is copyrighted and that the directly
61. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434 (1984) ("The
Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for infringement committed by another.");
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1373
(N.D. Cal. 1995) ("there is no statutory rule of liability for infringement committed by others.").
62. See LEAFFER, supra note 22, § 9.20.
Although not expressly recognized in the 1976 Act, a person can be liable as a related
defendant for the infringing activity of another. This general principal is derived from
[17 U.S.C.] § 106, which grants the copyright owner the exclusive right to authorize
others to exploit the exclusive rights of ownership. [See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 159
(1976).] Through this provision, the principle of related defendants is recognized in the
1976 Act. As used in following subsections, the term "related defendants" refers to all
situations where one can be held liable for the acts of another, including vicarious liabil-
ity and liability for contributory infringement.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
63. See id. at 435 ("For vicarious liability is imposed in virtually all areas of the law, and the
concept of contributory infringement is merely a species of the broader problem of identifying the
circumstances in which it is just to hold one individual accountable for the actions of another.").
64. See Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 435.
65. See Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162
(2d Cir. 1971) (holding that a party may be liable for contributory copyright infringement where
"with knowledge of the infringing activity, [it] induces, causes or materially contributes to the
infringing conduct of another"); Sega Enters. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 932 (N.D. Cal.
1996) (finding that to impose liability on defendant for contributory infringement, plaintiff must
show that defendant induced, caused, or materially contributed to their infringing activity).
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infringing party is violating one or more of the copyright owner's exclusive
rights. 66
Like the requirements for establishing direct infringement, the ele-
ments and corresponding factual requirements required for a successful
contributory infringement claim present the plaintiff with both advantages
and drawbacks-especially in the online context.
The plaintiff is aided, as previously noted, because the theory of con-
tributory infringement offers them the ability to hold parties liable for the
infringement of others. Thus, the plaintiff need not, for example, individu-
ally sue each of the thousands or millions of direct infringers downloading
an infringing picture on the Internet. Rather, the plaintiff could, under the
theory of contributory infringement, sue the Internet Service Provider
("ISP") for inducing, causing or materially contributing to the infringing
activity committed by another on the theory that the ISP has provided the
necessary means enabling the direct infringement. Thus, the theory of con-
tributory liability is attractive to plaintiffs where claims of direct infringe-
ment against the ISP are unavailing and where successful pursuit of some,
any or all of the other direct infringers is unlikely. Because a plaintiff can
surely find one direct infringer on the Internet, 67 plaintiffs can almost al-
ways pursue the ISP, or some other third party, under a theory of contribu-
tory liability.
Conversely, the theory of contributory liability has two primary draw-
backs for plaintiffs. First, because the plaintiff must offer highly factual
evidence showing intent and contribution to causing the infringing activity,
defendants are more likely to survive summary judgment. Many of the
cases decided involving copyright infringement through Internet use arise in
the procedural context of the plaintiff moving for summary judgment. De-
fendants have successfully defeated these motions due to the presence of
factual disputes relevant to proving contributory infringement. Second,
courts have not clearly or consistently defined exactly what behavior rises
to the level of inducing, causing or materially contributing to the directly
infringing activity. Courts also have differed as to when a defendant actu-
ally knew or should have known that infringing activity was occurring. This
lack of an articulated standard creates great uncertainty as to what behavior
constitutes contributory infringement online. Consequently, plaintiffs can-
not be sure when contributory liability will be successfully pled.
66. See Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162; Sega, 948 F. Supp. at 933. "The standard for the
knowledge requirement is objective, and is satisfied where the defendant knows or has reason to
know of the infringing activity." Id. (citing Casella v. Morris, 820 F.2d 362, 365 (11 th Cir. 1987)).
67. Browsers, for example, are all arguably direct infringers.
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C. Vicarious Infringement
The theory of vicarious infringement, like contributory infringement,
expands the net of liability to third parties not directly infringing. 68 Here,
however, the circumstances under which a court will find it "just" or "fair"
to hold a party equally accountable for the infringements committed by a
third party differ from those of contributory infringement. 69 A party may be
held vicariously liable where: (1) the party "has the right and ability to
supervise the infringing activity"; 70 and also (2) "has a direct financial in-
terest in such activities." 7 1 Importantly, a defendant may be equally liable
for federal copyright infringement with the direct infringer irrespective of
whether the defendant had knowledge72 of the infringing activity or
whether the defendant actively participated in the direct infringement in any
way. 73 Thus, unlike contributory liability, where the behavior and intent of
the defendant determines liability, under the theory of vicarious liability,
the relationship between the defendant and the direct infringer determines
the defendant's liability. 74
Helpful to understanding the doctrine of vicarious liability are the
often used metaphors of relationships between landlords and their tenants as
compared to operators of "dance-halls" (entertainment venues) to the alleg-
edly infringing performers in those establishments. 75 Generally speaking,
landlords are often not considered vicariously liable for the infringing acts
of their tenants because landlords generally do not receive a direct financial
benefit from a tenant's infringing activity nor do they exercise control over
the.leased premises.76 The landlord's knowledge of the infringing activity is
irrelevant. 77 The closer a relationship is to this "landlord-tenant" analogy,
68. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261-64 (9th Cir. 1996) (dis-
cussing vicarious liability); LEAFFER, supra note 22, § 9.20[C] (discussing generally doctrine of
vicarious liability).
69. See LEAFFER, supra note 22, § 9.20[C].
70. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262 (citing Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162).
71. Id.
72. See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 261-64 (discussing vicarious liability). "Knowledge" here
means that the defendant neither actually knew nor should have known of the infringing activity.
See id.; see LEAFFER, supra note 22, § 9.20[C] (discussing generally doctrine of vicarious
liability).
73. See LEAFFER, supra note 22, § 9.20[C].
74. See id.; Shulman, supra note 7, at 575 (discussing vicarious liability generally and in
relation to online context).
75. See LEAFFER, supra note 22, § 9.20[C] (discussing generally doctrine of vicarious liabil-
ity); Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 261-64 (discussing vicarious liability); see also Shulman, supra note 7,
at 575.
76. See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262; see LEAFFER, supra note 22, § 9.20[C]; see also Shulman,
supra note 7, at 575.
77. See LEAFFER, supra note 22, § 9.20[C].
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the less likely it is that the defendant in the position analogous to the land-
lord will be held liable for vicarious copyright infringement. 78 Compara-
tively, the operator of an entertainment venue is often considered
vicariously liable for the directly infringing performances of entertainers in
its venue because the operator has the ability to control the premises and the
operator obtains a direct financial benefit from the audience's paying to see
the infringing performances. 79 These metaphors simply act as easily under-
standable guideposts helpful to determining when a party has met the re-
quirements for which the law deems it just to impose liability for the acts of
another.80 Both metaphors, however, are founded upon the same legal re-
quirements of control and financial benefit and ultimately turn on the rela-
tionship of the defendant to the direct infringer.8'
Beyond expanding the net of liability to parties not directly infringing,
the doctrine of vicarious liability offers plaintiffs the ability to impose lia-
bility on third parties to the same extent as direct infringers where the third
party maintains a particular type of relationship with the direct infringer.
Thus, unlike contributory infringement, but like direct infringement, liabil-
ity can justly be imposed on a party not directly infringing even if that party
did not intend to aid or otherwise contribute to the infringement. The de-
fendant's knowledge of the infringing activity is irrelevant.
Applying the doctrine of vicarious liability in the Internet context
presents many as yet unanswered questions. The recent increase in Internet
use has resulted in part from the recognition that the medium offers new
commercial opportunities and advantages. Consequently, financial benefit,
while not originally the reason for its development, has become an impor-
tant, if not primary, purpose for many parties' Internet activity. Whether
any of these parties directly benefit from Internet use may, however, depend
not only on courts' definitions of "direct" financial benefit as applied to the
online context but also on the particular type of activity conducted by the
alleged vicarious infringer on the Internet. Also relevant to a claim of vica-
rious copyright infringement is the fact that because the Internet is com-
prised of networks of computers, some party must necessarily exercise
some level of control over certain aspects of those networks. What level of
control is necessary, and what actually exists, however, are questions that
threaten the applicability of vicarious liability in the Internet context.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id. (discussing generally doctrine of vicarious liability); see also Fonovisa, 76 F.3d
at 261-64 (discussing vicarious liability); Shulman, supra note 7, at 575.
81. See Shulman, supra note 7, at 575.
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III. The Difficulties of Applying Traditional Theories of
Infringement to the Internet
As the discussion in the previous section suggests, copyright owners
have attempted to employ the three traditional theories of liability for copy-
right infringement against allegedly infringing Internet operations. Courts
have accepted and rejected these arguments to varying degrees as judges
have struggled to stretch the applicable statutory and case law to fit the
technology of the Internet. This "first wave" of decided cases illustrates the
difficulties in applying existing copyright laws to the technology of the In-
ternet. Consequently, the decisions anticipate the legislative changes likely
to be made to copyright law in efforts to address these issues.
A. Direct Infringement
Imposing direct liability on online service providers ("OSPs") has
proved surprisingly difficult, even for those courts accepting the reasoning
and conclusions of MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc.,8 2 which
held that works viewed and transmitted on the Internet are "copies" for
purposes of the Copyright Act. The reason courts have struggled to impose
direct liability on certain parties results from the fact that the technology
used by those parties whom plaintiffs wish to hold directly liable-namely
the ISPs, BBSs and/or Web site operators-automatically creates the alleg-
edly infringing copies. That is, once the ISP, BBS or Web site operator sets
up its system of hardware and software, the copies are made automatically
without any further or direct involvement by those parties. Thus, a user
wishing to download a work from a Web site will select the work, which
will automatically be routed through the various routers or node computers
in the particular transmission path, automatically pass though the ISP and
possibly the BBS, the modems will automatically buffer the works, and the
work will automatically be copied into the user's RAM.
The central issue that courts have struggled to answer is whether voli-
tion should be required in order to find a third party liable for direct copy-
82. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993). While no courts
have considered the effect of WIPO, courts would encounter the same problems in considering
direct liability as they do as a result of accepting MAI. But see David L. Hayes, Advanced Copy-
right Issues on the Internet, § II.F.3.(a) (visited Apr. 13, 1998) <http://www.fenwick.conmpub/
copy. html> (arguing that the recent case of Marobie-FL, Inc. v. National Ass'n of Fire Equip.
Distribs., 983 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D. Ill. 1997) could be construed to hold "the distribution and
public display rights to cover both the making available of the [plaintiff s copyrighted work] to the
public on the [defendant's] Web page (a right of access), as well as subsequent downloads by
users (a right of transmission)").
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right infringement. 83 That is, even though direct copyright infringement is a
strict liability tort, does it make sense to hold a party directly liable for
copying when that party has not actually participated in the copying? Addi-
tionally, even if volition should be required, should direct volitional activity
be required,84 or is it sufficient that the third party only intentionally created
the automatic means enabling the copying to occur-thereby only indirectly
participating in the copying?
The widely discussed Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena85 was the first
case to consider liability for direct copyright infringement by a defendant
conducting activity on the Internet. The Frena court held that the operator
of a BBS was directly liable for infringing the plaintiff's exclusive rights of
distribution and display 86 in its copyrighted photographs. The BBS auto-
matically distributed and displayed the plaintiff's copyrighted photographs
to the BBS's subscribers. 87 The operator of the BBS himself did not upload
any of the photographs to the bulletin board. 88 Rather, the subscribers ac-
tively uploaded and downloaded the infringing pictures to the BBS's com-
puters.89 The BBS operator removed the photographs upon notice of their
presence on his system.90 Thus, Frena held the BBS operator liable even
though the BBS operator did not himself perform the infringing activity. 91
The Frena decision is initially easy to understand in light of the strict
liability nature of the copyright laws. Commentators, however, have heavily
criticized the decision, interpreting Frena's holding to limit its applicability
as well as offering other reasons for the decision not articulated by the
court.92 While the decision may, in retrospect, be viewed as innocent or
83. See generally Hayes, Tidal Wave, supra note II (discussing whether volition is required
for a finding of direct infringement).
84. See id. § Il.A.4 (asking whether direct volition as compared to volition is an important
distinction).
85. 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
86. See id. at 1554. Interestingly, and somewhat curiously, the court did not find that the
defendant had violated the plaintiffs exclusive right of reproduction. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id. But see Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line, 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1371 n.16
(N.D. Cal. 1995) ("The finding of direct infringement was perhaps influenced by the fact that
there was some evidence that defendants in fact knew of the infringing nature of the works, which
were digitized photographs labeled 'Playboy' and 'Playmate."').
89. See Frena, 839 F. Supp. at 1554.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See Hayes, Tidal Wave, supra note 11, § II.A.4 for a representative criticism and good
summary of the reasons why Frena has been criticized and limited.
The reach of [Frena] may be limited, however, because the BBS was apparently one
devoted to photographs, much of it adult subject matter, and subscribers routinely
uploaded and downloaded images therefrom. Thus, the court may have viewed Frena
[the BBS operator] as a more direct participant in the infringement, having set up a
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naive as to the policy considerations concerning liability on the Internet, the
case might objectively be viewed as the most literal application of the strict
liability nature of the Copyright Act to Internet activity. Other courts, how-
ever, have subsequently presented reasons why third parties, who them-
selves did not actually participate in the copying, should not be liable for
direct infringement, even though their facilities necessarily and unquestion-
ably actually caused the copying.
Contrary to the seemingly straightforward application of strict liability
by Frena, the court in Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line93
held that some volition by third parties was required in order to impose
liability on third parties supplying the copying facilities for direct infringe-
ment.94 There, an individual (Erlich) posted allegedly infringing works to
the defendant BBS's (Klemesrud) computer for use through Usenet. 95 The
BBS gained its access to the Internet through the defendant ISP (Netcom).96
Once the work was posted to the BBS, the BBS's computer automatically
stored the works, and the ISP automatically copied the works from the BBS
to its own computers and then onto other Usenet computers. 97 The Usenet
servers maintained the works on Netcom's computers for eleven days and
on the BBS's computer for three days. 98 Neither the BBS nor the ISP con-
bulletin board that was devoted to the kind of activity that would foreseeably lead to
infringement. The undisputed evidence of the presence on the bulletin board of the
plaintiffs photographs, some of which had been edited to remove the plaintiff's trade-
marks and to add Frena's advertisements, was apparently evidence of sufficient involve-
ment for the court to find direct infringement of the public distribution right. Similarly,
Frena's selection of the infringing content for inclusion in the bulletin board was appar-
ently sufficient involvement to find direct infringement of the public display right.
Id.
93. 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
94. See id. at 1369. The court did not expressly rule contrary to Frena, noting that the court
was finding that the reproduction right was not directly violated, where Frena addressed only the
distribution and display rights. See id. at 1369-70.
95. The Usenet is:
a worldwide community of electronic BBSs that is closely associated with the Internet
and with the Internet community. The messages in Usenet are organized into thousands
of topical groups or "Newsgroups."
As a Usenet user, you read and contribute ('post') to your local Usenet site. Each
Usenet site distributes its users' postings to other Usenet sites based on various implicit
and explicit configuration settings, and in turn receives postings from other sites.
Id. at 1365 n.4 (citing DANIEL P. DERN, THE INTERNET GUIDE FOR NEW USERS 196-97 (1994));
see also Hayes, Tidal Wave, supra note 11, § II.A.4, at n.35.
96. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1366.
97. See id. at 1367-68.
98. Such procedure is standard and done for the convenience of Usenet users and for easing
transmission. See id. at 1367; Hayes, Tidal Wave, supra note 11, § II.A.4 ("In accordance with
usual Usenet procedures, Usenet servers maintained the posted works for a short period of
time .... ").
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trolled, created or selected the content posted to its computers or made it
available to their subscribers. 99 The ISP took no action after plaintiffs noti-
fied the ISP that allegedly infringing works were being posted to its
system. 100
In an important leap for copyright law as applied in the online context,
the court stated the issue presented as "whether possessors of computers are
liable for incidental copies automatically made on their computers using
their software as part of a process initiated by a third party."' 01 The issue
arose, according to the court, because "unlike MAI, the mere fact that
Netcom's systems incidentally make temporary copies of plaintiffs' works
does not mean Netcom has caused the copying."10 2 In refusing to hold the
ISP or the BBS liable for direct infringement, Judge Whyte held that
"Although copyright is a strict liability statute, there should still be some
element of volition or causation which is lacking where a defendant's sys-
tem is merely used to create a copy by a third party."' 10 3
Judge Whyte's reasoning laid the foundation for subsequent court de-
cisions. Significantly, he stated that "Netcom's act of designing or imple-
menting a system that automatically and uniformly creates temporary
copies of all data sent through it is not unlike that of the owner of a copying
machine who lets the public make copies with it." 104 Recognizing the
unique nature of the Internet, Judge Whyte identified important policy con-
siderations relevant to direct infringement, stating that a finding of direct
liability would necessarily require a finding that all Usenet computers trans-
mitting Erlich's work, and therefore all users in that network link, would be
99. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1368.
100. See id. Importantly for purposes of contributory infringement, the court noted that the
notice given by plaintiffs to defendant Netcom was irrelevant to a finding of liability for direct
infringement, but was relevant to contributory infringement analysis. See id. at 1370 ("Whether a
defendant makes a direct copy that constitutes infringement cannot depend on whether it received
a warning to delete the message. This distinction may be relevant to contributory infringement,
however, where knowledge is an element.").
101. Id. at 1368.
102. Id. at 1368-69.
103. Id. at 1370.
104. Id. at 1369. The court stated that "Although some of the people using the machine may
directly infringe copyrights, courts analyze the machine owner's liability under the rubric of con-
tributory infringement, not direct infringement." Id. (emphasis added) (citing RCA Records v.
All-Fast Sys., Inc., 594 F. Supp. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 12,
§ 12.04[A][2][b], at 12-78 to -79 (1995); Elkin-Koren, supra note 30, at 363). The court also
noted the possible applicability of § Ill of the Copyright Act exempting passive carriers other-
wise liable for secondary transmissions. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1369 n.12. The court ulti-
mately concluded that the analogy of Internet Service Providers to these carriers "is not
completely appropriate as Netcom does more than just 'provide the wire and conduits.' Further,
Internet providers are not natural monopolies that are bound to carry all the traffic that one wishes
to pass through them, as with the usual common carrier." Id.
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liable. 10 5 Thus, the very nature of the Internet would result in direct copy-
right infringement by potentially millions of people who simply used the
Internet in standard ways. 10 6 Consequently, the court found that imposing
liability on either the ISP or the BBS would be unreasonable. 10 7
Netcom is important for understanding copyright infringement on the
Internet because the case recognized that the nature of the Internet's opera-
tion requires focusing on a party's actual participation in the copying. Addi-
tionally, Judge Whyte recognized that, unlike traditional mediums, volition
becomes central to liability on the Internet because the technology automat-
ically operates to copy.' 0 8 Once the system is set-up, no further direct voli-
tion as to any particular act of copying by the OSP occurs. Thus, while at
first blush, Netcom appeared to have created a volition requirement out of
whole cloth, the case can be better understood as recognizing that the nature
of the Internet requires additional considerations not present in traditional
mediums.
Initially, Netcom appeared to have defined the course subsequent cases
would take with respect to imposing direct liability. The much-discussed
case Sega Enterprises v. MAPHIA'0 9 appeared to solidify the standard es-
tablished in Netcom. There, the court declined to hold the operators of a
105. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1369-70.
Plaintiffs' theory [of imposing direct infringement] would create many separate acts of
infringement and, carried to its natural extreme, would lead to unreasonable liabil-
ity . . . . [Pilaintiff s theory further implicates a Usenet server that carries Erlich's
message to other servers regardless of whether that server acts without any human inter-
vention beyond the initial setting up of the system. It would also result in liability for
every single Usenet server in the worldwide link of computers transmitting Erlich's
message to every other computer. These parties, who are liable under plaintiffs' theory,
do no more than operate or implement a system that is essential if Usenet messages are
to be widely distributed. There is no need to construe the [Copyright] Act to make all of
these parties infringers.
Id.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 1372.
Where the infringing subscriber is clearly directly liable for the same act, it does not
make sense to adopt a rule that could lead to the liability of countless parties whose role
in the infringement is nothing more than setting up and operating a system that is neces-
sary for the functioning of the Internet. Such a result is unnecessary as there is already a
party directly liable for causing the copies to be made. . . . The court does not find
workable a theory of infringement that would hold the entire Internet liable for activities
that cannot reasonably be deterred.
Id.
108. See id. at 1368.
109. 948 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996). This case represents the final substantive determina-
tion in a series of related cases. See Sega Enters. v. MAPHIA, No. CIV.A.93-4262CW, 1997 WL
337558 (N.D. Cal. June 9, 1997) (granting of'damages and permanent injunction against BBS
operator); Sega Enters. v. Sabella, No. C93-04260CW, 1996 WL 780560 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18,
1996); Sega Enters. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
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BBS liable for direct copyright infringement. 0 The court expressly
adopted Judge Whyte's reasoning in Netcom, stating that direct infringe-
ment requires a showing that the defendant herself directly engaged in the
copying.'" Like Netcom, the BBS operator in Sega merely set-up and
maintained the computer network that automatically enabled others to di-
rectly copy. 112 Thus, lack of volition beyond the mere setting up of the
automatically copying BBS by the defendant precluded a finding of direct
infringement. '13
Courts appear to be adopting the volition requirement established in
Netcom and subsequently adopted in Sega. 114 Interestingly, however, while
110. See Sega, 948 F. Supp. at 932. The court clarified its previous holding in Sega Enters. v.
MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994), stating that "To the extent that order can be read to
suggest that [defendant] may be liable for direct copyright infringement, it is clarified and super-
seded by this order." Sega, 948 F. Supp. at 932 n.5.
11l. See Sega, 948 F. Supp. at 932 (citations omitted).
While [defendant's] actions in this case are more participatory than those of the defend-
ants in Netcom, the Court finds Netcom persuasive. Sega has not shown that [defendant]
himself uploaded or downloaded the files, or directly caused such uploading or
downloading to occur. The most Sega has shown is that [defendant] operated his BBS,
that he knew infringing activity was occurring, and that he solicited others to upload
games. However, whether [defendant] knew his BBS users were infringing on Sega's
copyright, or encouraged them to do so, has no bearing on whether [defendant] directly
caused the copying to occur. Furthermore, [defendant's] actions as a BBS operator and
copier seller are more appropriately analyzed under contributory or vicarious liability
theories. Therefore, because Sega has not shown that [defendant] directly caused the
copying, [defendant] cannot be liable for direct infringement.
Id.
112. See id.
113. See id. But see Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Sanfilippo, No. 97-0670, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5125, at *7-9 (Mar. 24, 1998) (finding defendant directly copied plaintiff's images where a third-
party source uploaded to defendant's hard drive via a File Transfer Protocol exchange). "Under
§ 106 of the Copyright Act, the owner has the exclusive right to both (a) copy the protected work
and (b) authorize others to copy it. Therefore, defendant did not have the authority to allow the
third party to upload unauthorized copies of plaintiff's images." Sanfilippo, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5125, at *8. But see 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1995); Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communica-
tions Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that no independent "right of authoriza-
tion" exists under the language of § 106, which gives the copyright owner the exclusive right "to
do or to authorize" the enumerated acts. The court held the "to authorize" language was intended
only to codify potential liability for contributory liability for the party authorizing infringement).
114. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503, 512-13 (N.D.
Ohio 1997) (adopting the reasoning of Netcom, but distinguishing its facts from the case at bar,
thereby imposing liability for direct infringement on a BBS). In finding the defendant BBS liable
for violating plaintiff's distribution and display rights, the court noted that
As a legal matter, the court would agree with Judge Whyte [in Netcom] that a finding of
direct copyright infringement requires some element of direct action or participa-
tion .... That being said, the facts of this case, unlike Frena, Sega, and Netcom, are
sufficient to establish that defendants [violated plaintiff's exclusive rights of distribution
and display]. This finding hinges on two crucial facts: (1) defendants' policy of encour-
aging subscribers to upload files, including adult photographs, onto the system, and (2)
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courts maintain volition as established in Netcom as a requirement for find-
ing direct infringement, these courts are finding that Web site operators
generally exhibit the requisite volition, while ISPs and BBSs do not.
Where the Internet operation is truly automatic in carrying out its func-
tions, such as the ISP or BBS in Netcom, the courts appear unlikely to find
that the operator has acted with the requisite volition for a finding of direct
infringement."1 5 Conversely, where the operator has a large amount of di-
rect involvement in the actual functions performed by the Internet operation
(such as an operator of a Web site who personally selects and posts infring-
ing pictures to his or her Web site, thereby making them available to be
downloaded by visitors to the site), the courts are likely to find the requisite
volition."16 The range of behavior between these two extremes, however,
has yet to be fully explored by the courts.
The Webbworld cases" t7 represent such a middle ground. There, the
defendants operated a Web site through which visitors could obtain, for a
defendants' policy of using a screening procedure in which [defendant's] employees
viewed all files in the upload file and moved them into the generally available files for
subscribers. These two facts transform defendants from passive providers of a space in
which infringing activities happened to occur to active participants in the process of
copyright infringement.
Id.
See also Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032, 1039
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding a Web site operator liable for direct copyright infringement for posting
infringing pictures of plaintiffs copyrighted works, noting that defendant actually supplied the
content for his Web site by himself uploading the infringing images to the World Wide Web
server. Distinguishing Netcom, the court noted "Here, Defendant does more than simply provide
access to the Internet. It also provides its own services . . . and supplies the content for these
services").
115. See Sega Enters. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 932 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Religious Tech.
Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1367 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
But see Central Point Software, Inc. v. Nugent, 903 F. Supp. 1057, 1060 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (hold-
ing BBS liable for direct infringement for providing users the ability to download plaintiff's copy-
righted software).
116. See Chuckleberry Publ'g, 939 F. Supp. at 1039 (holding a Web site operator liable for
direct copyright infringement for posting infringing pictures of plaintiff's copyrighted works, not-
ing that defendant actually "suppl[ied] the content" for his Web site by himself uploading the
infringing images to the World Wide Web server.) Distinguishing Netcom, the court noted "Here,
Defendant does more than simply provide access to the Internet. It also provides its own serv-
ices ... and supplies the content for these services." See id.
See Marobie-FL, Inc. v. National Ass'n of Fire Equip. Distribs. & N.W. Nexus, Inc., 983 F.
Supp. 1167 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (holding Web site operator liable for direct infringement where Web
site operator's agent actually copied infringing images to defendant-Web site operator's computer
and then copied the files onto the hard drive of the service provider's computer (servers) by
transmitting them over the Internet).
117. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1171 (N.D. Tex. 1997) [here-
inafter Webbworld I]; Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Tex.
1997) [hereinafter Webbworld 11] [hereinafter, these cases collectively referred to as "the
Webbworld cases"]. The Webbworld cases both arose from the same situation. The defendant
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fee, adult-oriented images." 18 Significantly, none of the defendants them-
selves actually posted any of plaintiff's copyrighted works to the defendant-
operated Web site. 119 Rather, the defendants created software that automati-
cally selected the desired works from newsgroups and subsequently auto-
matically posted the ultimately selected images to the defendants' Web site.
Visitors and subscribers of the defendants' Web site were then able to view
and download the infringing images.120
In holding the defendant-Web site operators liable for direct infringe-
ment, the court rejected defendants' arguments that they should not be di-
rectly liable because, like the ISP and BBS in Netcom, they served as a
mere conduit between their subscribers and adult-oriented newsgroups. l2
The court apparently recognized, without expressly stating, the dilemma
presented by the particular facts of defendant's operation. That is, because
the defendants in Webbworld did not themselves actually download or
upload the infringing pictures, Netcom's holding seemingly precluded a
finding of direct infringement. However, the reasoning of Netcom could be
stretched to fit the Webbworld situation in that the defendants in Webbworld
arguably did act with the requisite "Netcom volition"-the only difference
being that they created software to automatically do the job for them. Thus,
obtained its [infringing] images from selected newsgroups according to the following general
method.
Defendant Ellis [one of the operators of the Web site] selected the particular adult-
oriented newsgroups to be downloaded. Periodically, Webbworld received a "news
feed," which consisted of digital files from the selected adult newsgroups. The informa-
tion was downloaded onto the news server computer. The feed consisted of both text
and images, representing all of the new material that had been posted onto the new-
sgroup since the last feed.
The heart of the Webbworld operation was 'ScanNews,' software that Ellis had devel-
oped. ScanNews took the news feed, discarded most of the text, and retained the sexu-
ally-oriented images. A small amount of identifying text was sometimes retained. After
the news feed was edited, the news server would announce to the twelve Web servers,
via the ScanNews software, that its images were ready to be transferred. Each of the
Web servers would contact the news server computer and [automatically] copy into
memory the new adult images stored there. The news server then discarded that data to
make room for the next news feed.
Besides discarding text, the ScanNews software altered the news feed in a second way.
It created two "thumbnail" copies, one large and one small, for each of the adult images
downloaded from the Usenet .... The thumbnails were not part of the news feed; they
were created by the ScanNews software to facilitate Webbworld's sale of the images
they represented.
Webbworld H, 991 F. Supp. at 549-50.
118. See Webbworld H at 549.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id. at 552 ("Unlike the defendant service provider in [Netcom], Webbworld did not
function as a mere provider of access.").
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while offering somewhat clumsy reasoning, 122 the court understandably
found the defendants liable for direct infringement, rejecting the defend-
ants' contention that they acted without the requisite volition because their
operation acted "automatically."' 123 Thus, here, automatic operation did not
equate to lack of volition.
Webbworld offers a glimpse at the technological and creative behav-
iors likely to challenge the "Netcom volition" analysis. However, in this
author's opinion, the principle established in Netcom-that direct volitional
activity evidencing some element of causation is necessary for a finding of
direct infringement-appears likely to be followed by courts, guiding them
in imposing direct liability.
B. Contributory Infringement
While defendants may be able to escape liability for direct infringe-
ment depending on their level of actual involvement in the infringing activi-
ties, those defendants may nonetheless be contributorily liable for the same
behavior.
Unfortunately for Internet businesses, but fortunately for copyright
owners, many courts have accepted contributory liability as a viable theory
under which most Internet operations can be held liable for copyright in-
fringement. Indeed, all of the cases to consider the applicability of contribu-
tory liability to an Internet operation-whether it be an ISP, BBS, some
combination of both, or a Web site-have at least held the theory to be one
for which a jury could reasonably find the defendant liable. Additionally, at
least some of those courts have granted plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment, thereby finding defendant contributorily liable as a matter of law.
122. See id.
[U]nlike the Defendant in [Netcom], Webbworld did not function as a passive conduit of
unaltered information. Instead, Webbworld functioned primarily as a store, a commer-
cial destination within the Internet. Just as a merchant might re-package and sell mer-
chandise from a wholesaler, so did Webbworld re-package (by deleting text and creating
thumbnails) and sell images it obtained from the various newsgroups. In contrast to the
defendants in [Netcom], Webbworld took "affirmative steps to cause the copies to be
made." Such steps included using the ScanNews software to troll the Usenet for
Webbworld's product.
Id.
"[Additionally], Webbworld exercised total dominion over the content of its site and the
product it offered its clientele. As a shop owner may choose from what sources he or she contracts
to buy merchandise, so, too, did Webbworld have the ability to choose its newsgroups sources."
See id.
123. See id. at 553 ("In any event, having developed and launched the ScanNews software for
commercial use, Webbworld cannot now evade [direct] liability by claiming helplessness in the
face of its 'automatic' operation.").
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Netcom also made an important step in applying the theory of contrib-
utory liability to the Internet. While the defendants in Netcom (the ISP and
BBS) were not directly liable, the court held that sufficient evidence existed
such that a jury could reasonably find these defendants contributorily liable
for a third party's (Erlich) infringing postings passing through defendants'
networks.124 There, the ISP, while initially unaware of the infringing activ-
ity, received notice of the infringing activity from the plaintiffs. 2 5 Impor-
tantly, this notice raised the issue of the defendant-ISP's responsibility to
verify the plaintiff's allegation of infringing activity occurring on the de-
fendant's system.
1. Knowledge of Infringing Activity
The central issue in the Netcom court's analysis of contributory liabil-
ity was whether the knowledge element was satisfied, not whether the de-
fendant participated "enough."' 26 The court held that the plaintiff's notice
of the infringing activity to the ISP combined with copyright notices on
many of the works posted to the Usenet acted to raise a triable issue of fact
as to whether Netcom "knew or should have known" of the infringing activ-
ity occurring on its networks.' 27 The court, however, mindfully cautioned
that a party will not be deemed to have sufficient knowledge-actual or
constructive-simply by an unsupported allegation by the plaintiff of in-
fringing activity.' 28 Thus, where an Internet operation cannot reasonably
124. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1375, 1382 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (presenting facts sufficient to raise a question as to Netcom's
knowledge once it received a letter from plaintiffs informing defendant of the allegedly infringing
activity on defendant's network. For the same reasons the court found plaintiffs' pleadings suffi-
cient to raise an issue of contributory infringement as to defendant Klemesrud, the BBS operator).
125. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1374. Klemesrud, the BBS operator, similarly received
notice from plaintiffs of the allegedly infringing activity. See id. at 1382. Thus, the court held that
the analysis for the BBS operator's contributory liability was the same as that applied to the ISP.
See id. Consequently, while this section analyzes the court's discussion of the ISP's contributory
liability, the analysis applies equally to the BBS. See id.
126. See id. at 1374-75 ("If plaintiffs can prove the knowledge element, Netcom will be
liable for contributory infringement since its failure to simply cancel Erlich's infringing message
and thereby stop an infringing copy from being distributed worldwide constitutes substantial par-
ticipation in Erlich's public distribution of the message."). As will be discussed later, the Netcom
decision was decided prior to Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
Thus, the Netcom court relied on Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 821 F. Supp. 616, 625
(N.D. Cal. 1993), aff'd 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994) for the standard that the participation by the
defendant must be "substantial" to constitute contributory infringement. Fonovisa held otherwise.
Fonvisa, 76 F.3d at 264.
127. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1374.
128. See id. ("Although a mere unsupported allegation of infringement by a copyright owner
may not automatically put a defendant on notice of infringing activity, Netcom's position that
liability must be unequivocal is unsupportable.").
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verify a plaintiff's claim of infringement occurring on the defendant's sys-
tem, the defendants will not be deemed to have the knowledge requisite for
a finding of contributory infringement. 129 However, the court also held that
it is fair to impose some level of affirmative verification of the infringing
activity on the defendant where facts-like works containing copyright no-
tices posted to the defendant's system-exist, giving rise to a reasonable
ability to verify the alleged infringing activity.1 30
Other courts have followed Netcom in at least finding that triable is-
sues of fact existed as to whether defendant had the requisite knowledge of
the infringing activity.1 3 1 At least one court has seemingly gone one step
further than Netcom, impliedly holding that operation of a BBS alone, with-
out more, operates to impose constructive knowledge on the defendant BBS
that infringing activity is occurring. 132 Consequently, ISPs and BBSs appar-
ently at least have the requisite knowledge for imposing contributory liabil-
129. See id.
The court is more persuaded by the argument that it is beyond the ability of a BBS
operator to quickly and fairly determine when a use is not infringement where there is at
least a colorable claim of fair use. Where a BBS operator cannot reasonably verify a
claim of infringement, either because of a possible fair use defense, the lack of copy-
right notices on the copies, or the copyright holder's failure to provide the necessary
documentation to show that there is a likely infringement, the operator's lack of knowl-
edge will be found reasonable and there will be no liability for contributory infringe-
ment for allowing the continued distribution of the works on its system.
Id.
130. See id. at 1374-75.
Where works contain copyright notices within them, as here, it is difficult to argue that a
defendant did not know that the works were copyrighted .... Thus, it is fair, assuming
Netcom is able to take simple measures to prevent further damage to plaintiffs' copy-
righted works, to hold Netcom liable for contributory infringement where Netcom has
knowledge of Erlich's infringing postings yet continues to aid in the accomplishment of
Erlich's purpose of publicly distributing the postings.
Id.
131. See Marobie-FL, Inc. v. National Ass'n of Fire Equip. Distribs. & N.W. Nexus, Inc., 983
F. Supp. 1167, 1179 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (finding issues of material fact precluded plaintiffs motion
for summary judgment requesting the court hold an Internet Service Provider contributorily liable
who stored co-defendant's Web page on its server); Sega Enters. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923,
932-33 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (holding BBS contributorily liable where BBS operator specifically
solicited uploading and downloading of plaintiffs copyrighted video games by BBS subscribers to
the BBS, and where BBS had undisputed knowledge of infringing activity).
132. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503, 514 (N.D. Ohio
1997) (holding the defendant BBS liable for contributory infringement). As to the issue of knowl-
edge the court stated:
Defendants admit that they encouraged subscribers to upload information including
adult files. . . . Also, defendants had at least constructive knowledge that infringing
activity was likely to be occurring on their BBS. Defendants were aware that PEI [plain-
tiff Playboy Enterprises, Inc.] was enforcing its copyrights against BBS owners. More-
over, Playboy Magazine is one of the most famous and widely distributed adult
publications in the world. It seems disingenuous for defendants to assert that they were
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ity where they receive notice that infringing activity is occurring on their
systems, and the allegedly infringing works have visible copyright notices.
Further, they potentially have the knowledge required to impose contribu-
tory liability simply by operating.
The effect of Netcom and subsequent cases defining the level of
knowledge required for contributory liability is two-fold. First, copyright
owners with works posted or likely to be posted somewhere on the Internet
should be advised to place copyright notices on all of their posted or to-be-
posted works. Second, the practical effect of Netcom on Internet operations
is to virtually guarantee a finding that the operator of the Internet operation
had-either actually or constructively-the requisite knowledge. This is be-
cause many pictures posted to the Internet already have copyright notices.
Further, because attorneys should and likely will advise their clients to
place copyright notices on their works after Netcom, an increasing number
of pictures will have copyright notices. 133 That being so, if a plaintiff sends
the defendant notice of the allegedly infringing activity, a defendant In-
ternet operation maintains a high risk of being deemed to have sufficient
knowledge for imposing contributory liability.
2. Participation in Infringing Activity
Beyond knowledge, liability for contributory copyright infringement
also requires that the defendant "induce, cause or materially contribute" to
the infringing activity. 134 In Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.,1 35 the
Ninth Circuit expanded the definition of "material" participation or contri-
bution to the infringing activity, holding that providing the site and facilities
known by consumers to be a location where infringing activity occurs is
sufficient to establish contributory liability.' 36
There, the Ninth Circuit held the operators of a swap meet contribu-
torily liable for acts of the individual vendors of the swap meet. 137 The
vendors sold plaintiff's copyrighted music recordings without the plaintiff's
unaware that copies of photographs from Playboy Magazine were likely to find their
way onto the BBS.
Id.
133. Of course, a problem potentially affecting this analysis, and one which, the courts have
yet to fully explore, is the removal of copyright notices by parties posting the pictures to the
various networks.
134. Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d
Cir. 1971).
135. 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
136. See id. at 264 ("[W]e agree with the Third Circuit's analysis ... that providing the site
and facilities for known infringing activity is sufficient to establish contributory liability.") (citing
Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986)).
137. See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264.
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permission. 38 Because the swap meet operators clearly had knowledge that
the infringing activity was occurring, 139 the sole issue as to the defendant's
liability for contributory infringement was whether the defendant's provi-
sion of the space, utilities, parking, advertising, plumbing and customers for
the benefit of the vendors of the swap meet constituted "material contribu-
tion" to the infringing activity. 140 In answering affirmatively, the court
noted that the vendors would have encountered difficulty in carrying out the
infringing activity without the defendant's provisions. l'4 ' The court con-
cluded that the swap meet, by providing these services, "actively strived" to
provide the environment necessary to carry out the infringing activities. 142
All of the cases decided after Fonovisa that have considered the appli-
cability of contributory liability to third parties' operations on the Internet
have contemplated the effect of Fonovisa's holding. ' 43 Understandably, the
reach of Fonovisa has allowed every court to consider the issue to hold at
least that simply providing Internet facilities that facilitate the infringing
activity could be found by a reasonable jury to satisfy the "material contri-
bution" element of contributory liability. 144 Other courts have found the
138. See id. at 261.
139. See id. ("There is also no dispute for purposes of this appeal that [the defendant] Cherry
Auction and its operators were aware that vendors in their swap meet were selling counterfeit
recordings in violation of Fonovisa's trademarks and copyrights.").
140. See id. at 264 ("The disputed issue is whether plaintiff adequately alleged that Cherry
Auction materially contributed to the infringing activity.").
141. See id. ("Indeed, it would be difficult for the infringing activity to take place in the
massive quantities alleged without the support services provided by the swap meet. These services
include, inter alia, the provision of space, utilities, parking, advertising, plumbing, and
customers.").
142. See id. ("[The swap meet operator] Cherry Auction actively strives to provide the envi-
ronment and the market for counterfeit recording sales to thrive. Its participation in the sales
cannot be termed 'passive .... ').
143. At least one court, however, did not find a need to address contributory liability once
direct infringement was established. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 939 F.
Supp. 1032, 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding Web site operator liable for direct copyright infringe-
ment for posting infringing pictures).
144. See Marobie-FL, Inc. v. National Ass'n of Fire Equip. Distribs. & N.W. Nexus, Inc., 983
F. Supp. 1167 (holding that while contributory infringement was a viable theory upon which
defendant Internet Service Provider could be liable, "disputed issues of material fact preclude[d]
summary judgment for either [the plaintiff or the defendant] on this theory of liability"); accord
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361,
1374-75, 1382 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (finding ISP and BBS were possibly subject to liability for con-
tributory infringement, even though it was decided after the district court decision but before the
Ninth Circuit Court decision in Fonovisa).
[Defendant ISP] Netcom allows Erlich's infringing messages to remain on its system
and be further distributed to other Usenet servers worldwide. It does not completely
relinquish control over how its system is used, unlike a landlord. Thus, it is fair, assum-
ing Netcom is able to take simple measures to prevent further damage to plaintiffs
copyrighted works, to hold Netcom liable for contributory infringement ....
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reach of Fonovisa sufficient to hold the provision of Internet facilities en-
abling infringing activity enough to constitute contributory infringement as
a matter of law.' 45
Additionally, courts have stated in dictum that regardless of the Fo-
novisa decision, providing such facilities plus some additional activity-
such as encouraging the infringing activity-satisfies the stricter interpreta-
tion of "substantial participation" used by other circuits. 146
Liability based on the theory of contributory infringement has been
consistently accepted by the courts in the online context. Thus, under the
current case law, Internet operations are at great risk of being held liable for
federal copyright infringement for activities occurring on or through their
networks.
C. Vicarious Infringement
Because plaintiffs have been successful in alleging contributory in-
fringement, not many courts have needed to consider the applicability of
vicarious infringement in the online context. Of the courts to consider the
issue, however, the conclusions reached have been somewhat mixed. Im-
portantly, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Fonovisa alters the likely future of
vicarious liability in the digital environment.
1. Direct Financial Benefit Resulting from Infringing Activity
In addition to expanding the contributory liability doctrine, the Ninth
Circuit in Fonovisa adopted a more lenient standard as to the relationship
Id. at 1375. The court applied the same analysis to the BBS. See id. at 1382.
145. See Sega Enters. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 932-33 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (holding BBS
operator liable for contributory infringement). The court noted that "[defendant] provided the fa-
cilities for copying the games by providing, monitoring, and operating the BBS software, hard-
ware, and phone lines necessary for the users to upload and download games." Id. at 933.
See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc. 982 F. Supp. 503, 514 (N.D. Ohio 1997)
(holding BBS operator contributorily liable). Citing Fonovisa, the court noted that "Defendants
clearly induced, caused, and materially contributed to any infringing activity which took place on
their BBS." Id..
See Sega Enters. v. Sabella, C93-04260, 1996 WL 780560, at *7-9 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18,
1996).
146. See MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. at 932-33.
Even under an alternative and higher standard of "substantial participation," [defendant
BBS operator] is liable [for contributory infringement]. Under this standard, [defendant]
is only liable if he knows of the users' infringing actions, and yet substantially partici-
pated by inducing, causing or materially contributing to the users' infringing conduct. In
this case, [defendant] did more than provide the site and facilities for the known infring-
ing conduct .... [Defendant's] role in copying, including providing facilities, direction,
knowledge, encouragement, and seeking profit, amounts to a prima facie case of con-
tributory copyright infringement.
[Vol. 33
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT ON THE INTERNET
between the defendant's financial benefit and the infringing activity re-
quired for a finding of vicarious liability. 147
In Fonovisa, the Ninth Circuit held that the swap meet operator both
sufficiently promoted and controlled the infringing activity as well as re-
ceived a financial benefit directly tied to and resulting from the infringing
sales of its vendors.' 48 As to the issue of financial benefit, the Fonovisa
court held that the sale of pirated recordings by the swap meet's vendors
constituted a "draw" for customers, thereby enhancing the attractiveness of
the swap meet to potential customers. 49 This relationship was thus similar
to the infringing performances of music supporting findings of vicarious
liability of the entertainment venue opeiators in the "dance hall" line of
cases.150 Consequently, the court found that a direct tie sufficient for a find-
ing of vicarious liability existed between the swap meet operator and the
vendors' infringing sales of pirated music because: (1) the infringing ven-
dors paid a daily rental fee to the swap meet operator to operate their
booths; (2) each customer of the swap meet directly paid an admission fee
to the defendant swap meet operator; and (3) customers seeking to purchase
the infringing recordings directly made other incidental payments to the de-
fendant swap meet operator for parking, food and other services.' 5'
As with the other two theories, the Netcom' 52 court was the first to
consider the applicability of vicarious liability to an Internet Service Pro-
vider. 153 The Netcom court held that the evidence presented by plaintiffs
raised a material question of fact as to defendant Netcom's right and ability
to control Erlich's (the direct infringer) use of Netcom's Internet serv-
ices. 154 The court, however, refused to hold the ISP, Netcom, vicariously
liable for Erlich's infringing activities because no evidence existed that Er-
lich's infringing activity in any way enhanced the value of Netcom's serv-
147. See Hayes, Tidal Wave, supra note 11, § II.C.3 (discussing Fonovisa's effect on vicari-
ous liability, stating: "It should be noted that the Ninth Circuit [subsequently] reversed [the district
court's decision in] Fonovisa, and appears to have adopted a less demanding standard for financial
benefit for purposes of vicarious liability ... .").
148. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261-64 (9th Cir. 1996).
149. See id. at 263-64 ("In this case, the sale of pirated recordings at the Cherry Auction
swap meet is a 'draw' for customers, as was the performance of pirated music in the dance hall
cases and their progeny.").
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1375-77, 1382 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
153. See id. at 1375-77, 1382 (applying vicarious liability to ISP and BBS).
154. See id. at 1376 ("[T]he court thus finds that plaintiffs have raised a genuine issue of fact
as to whether Netcom has the right and ability to exercise control over the activities of its sub-
scribers, and of Erlich in particular.").
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ices to subscribers or attracted new subscribers. 155 Consequently, the
requirement that a party "directly benefit financially" from the infringing
activity in order to be held vicariously liable for the acts of another was not
satisfied. 156
While Netcom was initially significant for recognizing the applicability
of the vicarious liability doctrine to online service providers, 57 the case is
of limited use because it was decided before the Ninth Circuit decision in
Fonovisa, and relied, rather, on the district court's holding in Fonovisa.5 8
Thus, it is unclear whether the Netcom court would have found a direct
financial benefit had the case been decided after the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion in Fonovisa.159 At least two cases decided after the court of appeals'
decision in Fonovisa, however, have considered what "direct financial ben-
efit" means in the online context. 160
The Webbworld cases 161 found the principal operators of a Web site
vicariously liable for the infringing activities occurring on the site. 162 There,
one defendant was the sole officer, director and shareholder of the company
running the Web site,163 and the other defendant conceived of the idea for
the site, ran the day-to day operations of the site and created the software
that automatically searched the Internet and obtained the infringing images
sold on the defendants' Web site. 164 Relying on the Ninth Circuit's decision
in Fonovisa, the court concluded that the defendants' financial interest in
the infringing activity occurring on their Web site was sufficiently direct to
support a finding of vicarious liability. 165 The court reasoned that, like Fo-
novisa, the plaintiff's infringed photographs available for sale on defend-
155. See id. at 1377 ("There is no evidence that infringement by Erlich, or any other user of
Netcom's services, in any way enhances the value of Netcom's services to subscribers or attracts
new subscribers.").
156. See id. ("Because plaintiffs have failed to raise a question of fact on this vital element [of
direct financial benefit], their claim of vicarious liability fails.") (citations omitted).
157. See id. at 1375-77 (analyzing doctrine of vicarious liability).
158. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry
Auction, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 1492 (E.D. Cal. 1994), rev'd, 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
159. Netcom was decided before the Ninth Circuit's decision in Fonovisa and, consequently,
relied on the district court's decision in Fonovisa. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375-77. The
district court's decision in Fonovisa was reversed by the Ninth Circuit on appeal. See Fonovisa,
76 F.3d at 264, 265.
160. See Marobie-FL, Inc. v. National Ass'n of Fire Equip. Distribs. & N.W. Nexus, Inc., 983
F. Supp. 1167, 1176 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Webbworld 1H, 991 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Tex. 1997);
Webbworld 1, 968 F. Supp. 1171 (N.D. Tex. 1997).
161. See Webbworld 11, 991 F. Supp. at 554; Webbworld 1, 968 F. Supp. at 1177.
162. See Webbworld 11, 991 F. Supp. at 554; Webbworld 1, 968 F. Supp. at 1176-77.
163. See Webbworld 11, 991 F. Supp. at 554; Webbworld 1, 968 F. Supp. at 1176-77.
164. See Webbworld 11, 991 F. Supp. at 554; Webbworld 1, 968 F. Supp. at 1176-77.
165. See Webbworld 1, 968 F. Supp. at 1176-77 ("[Based on the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Fonovisa], the court find that the financial interest of [the defendants in conducting their] infring-
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ants' Web site enhanced the attractiveness of the defendants' Web site to
potential customers. 166
However, this case may be of limited use as well. While the court
expressly relied on Fonovisa,167 the entire purpose of the Web site was to
sell adult pictures on the site by charging an access fee. 168 Regardless of the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Fonovisa, it is hard to imagine that the defendant
Web site operators could have maintained anything but a direct financial
interest resulting from the infringing activity.
Comparatively, in Marobie-FL, Inc. v. National Ass'n of Fire Equip-
ment Distributors and Northwest Nexus, Inc., 169 the district court refused to
hold an Internet Service Provider vicariously liable for the infringing post-
ings of a Web site using the ISP's service.' 70 The court reasoned that be-
cause the Web site's one-time setup fee and quarterly flat fee service
payments to the defendant service provider did not change based on the
number of visits to the infringing Web site, the infringing activity occurring
on the Web site did not financially benefit the defendant service pro-
vider. 17' Thus, the court apparently felt that the service provider's financial
interest was not tied at all to any visits to the co-defendant's Web site. 172
The service provider would receive the same payments regardless of
whether zero or a million browsers visited the Web site, and regardless of
whether they were visiting the site for the infringing material or for some
other reason. 173 Curiously, even though this district court was not bound by
ing activity [on their Web site] was sufficiently direct to support plaintiffs vicarious infringement
claim.").
166. See id. ("[T]he Ninth Circuit [in Fonovisa] found it sufficient that the infringing materi-
als likely enhanced the swap meet for its customers. The Ninth Circuit's reasoning applies as well
to this case, in which plaintiffs photographs enhanced the attractiveness of the [defendants']
Website to potential customers.").
167. See id.
168. See id. at 1173.
169. 983 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
170. See id. at 1179 ("Accordingly, [the ISP defendant] cannot be held vicariously liable for
[defendant-Web site operator's] infringement.").
171. See id.
[I]t is undisputed that NAFED [defendant Web site operator] paid Northwest [defendant
ISP] a one-time set-up fee of $20 and that since that time NAFED has paid Northwest a
flat fee of $67.50 each quarter. It is also undisputed that the fee Northwest receives has
never changed based on how many people visit NAFED's Web Page or what is ac-
cessed. In other words, NAFED's infringement did not financially benefit Northwest.
Id.
172. See id.
173. See id.
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Fonovisa, the court cited Netcom 174 (a district court decision within the
Ninth Circuit) but not Fonovisa.175
One can begin to appreciate the lack of clarity as to when an Internet
operation may be deemed to have a direct financial benefit in infringing
activities occurring on its computers. Does an ISP that charges a static
monthly fee for its services derive a "direct financial benefit" from any
infringing behavior of a Web site? of a BBS customer? Do the advertising
revenues that an ISP, BBS or Web site receives from advertisers advertising
on their operations' Web pages constitute a financial benefit "directly" tied
to the infringing behavior under Fonovisa? If so, is the practical effect that
all Internet operations with advertisements are vicariously liable for any
infringement occurring on their systems? These questions-important to
understanding the scope of vicarious liability on the Internet-have yet to
be addressed by the courts.
2. Right and Ability to Control Infringing Activity
In finding that the swap meet operator maintained the ability to exer-
cise sufficient control over the premises and infringing activity of its ven-
dors, 176 the Ninth Circuit in Fonovisa likened the situation in that case to
the "dance-hall" line of cases. 177 The court noted that: (1) the vendors oper-
ated booths within the premises that the swap meet operators controlled and
patrolled; (2) the swap meet operators possessed the ability to control the
infringing activities of the vendors through their right to terminate the ven-
dors' operations for any reason; and (3) the swap meet operators promoted
the swap meet and controlled the access of customers to the swap meet
area. 178 Courts have struggled to clearly define what circumstances consti-
tute sufficient "ability to control" in the online context in order to impose
vicarious liability.
Though Netcom was decided before the expansively-decided Fo-
novisa, the Netcom court still considered an Internet operation, which
merely provided access to the Internet, to maintain the requisite right and
174. See id.
175. The reason for this may have resulted from the fact that the plaintiff did not allege, either
in its complaint or briefs, that the defendant service provider should be held vicariously liable for
the copyright infringement of the Web site. See id. The court, however, apparently considered the
issue sua sponte. See id. at 1179. ("Plaintiff does not claim, either in its complaint or briefs, that
[the defendant ISP] Northwest is vicariously liable for copyright infringement. Nevertheless, the
court will briefly address this issue since Northwest seeks summary judgment in its favor on this
theory of liability.").
176. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261-63, 264 (9th Cir. 1996).
177. See id. at 261-63, 264 ("In terms of control, the allegations before us are strikingly
similar to those of Shapiro and Gershwin [the 'dance hall' cases].").
178. See id. at 262.
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ability to control infringing activity occurring through use of its networks to
potentially be liable for vicarious infringement.179
In Netcom, the court found that plaintiffs raised a material issue of fact
as to whether Netcom (the ISP) had the right and ability to exercise control
over the activities of its subscribers, and of the directly infringing poster,
Erlich.180 Importantly, the court was unconvinced by Netcom's argument
that Netcom could not possibly screen all of the users' messages before
they were posted given the enormous speed and volume of postings passing
through the ISP's networks.181 The court rejected Netcom's conclusion that
Netcom did not exercise control over the content of its users' postings given
the testimony of the plaintiff's expert that an easy software modification by
Netcom could identify postings that contain particular words or come from
particular individuals.' 82 Additionally, the court noted that, contrary to
Netcom's arguments, Netcom could possibly limit any particular individ-
ual's (such as Erlich's) access to Usenet without kicking off all 500 sub-
scribers of the co-defendant Klemesrud's BBS. 183 As evidence, the court
noted that Netcom had acted to suspend subscribers' accounts on over one
thousand occasions and that Netcom had the technological ability to delete
specific postings.184
Because Netcom was decided before the liberal interpretation of "right
and ability to control" by the court of appeals in Fonovisa, one would ex-
pect subsequent cases to uniformly follow Netcom's reasoning. Curiously,
however, subsequent cases have not uniformly decided the "right and abil-
ity to control" issue as applied to the online context.
Webbworld I cited Fonovisa approvingly, 8 5 holding the operators of a
Web site who utilized software to automatically select and post infringing
pictures on their site possessed the requisite ability and right to control the
infringing activity occurring on their Web site. 186 The court rejected (albeit
without discussion) the defendant's arguments that the automated nature of
the infringing activity eliminated the defendant's ability to control the in-
179. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1375-77, 1382 (N.D. Cal. 1995). The court, however, did not find the defendant vicariously
liable. See id. at 1377.
180. See id. at 1376 ("The court thus finds that plaintiffs have raised a genuine issue of fact as
to whether Netcom has the right and ability to exercise control over the activities of its subscrib-
ers, and of Erlich in particular.").
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. See Webbworld 1, 968 F. Supp. at 1176-77.
186. See id.: see also Webbworld H. 1997 WL 817312. at *8-9.
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fringing activity. 187 Importantly, the court noted that the relevant inquiry
was not whether the defendants maintained control over those responsible
for originally uploading the infringing images on the Internet, 188 but rather,
whether the defendants had the right and ability to control what occurred on
their Web site.189
Marobie'90 is the only other case to have considered vicarious liability
in the context of the Internet. The court summarily stated, without any anal-
ysis or discussion, that it was unclear to what degree a service provider
monitored, controlled or had the ability to monitor or control the contents of
a Web site using its service. 191 The reason for the court's decision, how-
ever, may have resulted from the plaintiff's failure to allege, either in its
complaint or briefs, that the defendant service provider should be held vi-
cariously liable for the alleged copyright infringement occurring on their
Web site.' 92 The court, apparently, considered the issue sua sponte.
In sum, the doctrine of vicarious liability has not been extensively
claimed by plaintiffs, and therefore, not fully explored by courts as applied
to Internet activity. However, the reach of Fonovisa seems to imply that
Internet operations are at a high risk of being found vicariously liable for
infringing activities occurring on their networks. However, courts are not
likely to need to employ the doctrine of vicarious liability, as contributory
infringement seems sufficiently expansive to impose liability. 93
IV. The Fair Use Defense-Not Security for Your Clients
"Fair use" is the "safety valve" of copyright law's strict liability na-
ture. The "fair use" defense recognizes that rigid application of the copy-
right statute would at times hinder the purpose of the copyright laws to
promote original and creative works for the benefit of society.194 When a
187. See Webbworld 1, 968 F. Supp. at 1177 ("Defendants' ... contentions that they lacked
control because the process was automated, are unavailing.").
188. See id. ("That defendants had no control over those responsible for originally uploading
the infringing images onto the Internet is not relevant to the issue of defendants' control over their
infringing activity.").
189. See id. ("The only relevant question regarding the element of control is whether defend-
ants had the right and ability to control what occurred on [their] Website.").
190. Marobie-FL, Inc. v. National Ass'n of Fire Equip. Distribs. & N.W. Nexus, Inc., 938 F.
Supp. 1167 (N.D. I11. 1997).
191. See id. at 1179.
192. See id.
193. See discussion supra Part III.B.
194. See Campell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576-80 (1994) (stating that the
defense "permits and requires courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on
occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster") (citation
omitted).
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fair use defense is asserted, a court is required to consider four, non-exclu-
sive factors in determining if, under the particular circumstances, a finding
of infringement would be unfair or unreasonable and therefore undermine
the "progress of science." 195 Thus, the defense is applied on a case-by-case
basis and is grounded upon a "rule of reason."'' 96
The four non-exclusive factors, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107 ("§ 107"),
are: (1) the purpose and character of the defendant's use of the allegedly
infringed work, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is
for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted
work; 19 7 (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used by the de-
fendant in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of
the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 198
Only a handful of courts have considered the fair use defense as applied to
online service providers.
All of the courts that have expressly denied a finding of fair use' 99
have concluded that all four factors weighed against the applicability of the
defense.200 All of the decisions involved commercial works that were com-
pletely copied and made available to users through the Internet.201 Impor-
195. See id.; see also LEAFFER, supra note 22, § 10.1.
196. See LEAFFER, supra note 22, § 10.1.
197. This factor relates to the "value of the materials used." Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 576
(quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901)). Additionally, this
factor includes consideration of both (1) whether the allegedly infringed work is "published" or
unpublished; and (2) whether the allegedly infringed work is information or creative. See Reli-
gious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1379 (N.D.
Cal. 1995).
198. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
199. See Marobie-FL, Inc. v. National Ass'n of Fire Equip. Distribs. & N.W. Nexus, Inc., 983
F. Supp. 1167, 1179 (N.D. 11. 1997); Sega Enters. v. MAPHIA, No. CIV.A.93-4262CW, 1997
WL 337558 (N.D. Cal. June 9, 1997); Sega Enters. v. Sabella, No. 93-04260CW 1996 WL
780560 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 1996); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla.
1993).
200. See Marobie, 983 F. Supp. at 1175-76 (finding defendant Web site not entitled to fair
use defense where Web site uploaded plaintiff's copyrighted software to defendant's Web site
without plaintiffs permission); Sega Enters. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 933-36 (N.D. Cal.
1996) (in holding BBS not entitled to application of fair use defense for encouraging uploading
and downloading of plaintiffs infringing video games, court noted that "All of the [four § 107]
factors ... weigh against the application of the fair use defense"); Sabella, 1996 WL 780560, at
*7-9 (holding BBS not entitled to application of fair use defense for encouraging uploading and
downloading of plaintiff's infringing video games, court noted that "All of the [four § 107] fac-
tors... weigh[ ] against the application of the fair use defense"); Frena, 839 F. Supp. at 1557-59
(finding defendant BBS not entitled to fair use defense for enabling infringing images of plaintiff-
Playboy Magazine's copyrighted photographs to be uploaded and downloaded on the defendant's
BBS).
201. See Marobie, 983 F. Supp. 1167, 1179; MAPHIA, 1997 WL 337558 (Consent Judgment
Order Granting Damages and Permanent Injunction Against Defendant Howard Silberg); Sabella,
1996 WL 780560; Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552.
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tantly, one case held that a Web site was not entitled to the fair use
defense,202 while the other cases held that the defense was not available to a
BBS.20 3 Consequently, the nature of the Internet operation is not dispositive
as to the availability of the fair use defense. Rather, the courts appear to
focus on the § 107 factors, considering the particular type of Internet ser-
vice operation involved only as it applies to the § 107 factors.
The only cases finding a fair use defense available to online service
providers support this notion. 204 The three Religious Technology cases20 5
all found fair use available as a defense. 20 6 The Netcom decision noted that
while the defendant ISP's use of the copyrighted material as part of its
Usenet services was commercial, the ISP's services at the same time ena-
bled the Internet to function, thereby promoting the goals of the Copyright
Act by promoting dissemination of other creative works through its ser-
vice. 207 In balancing the other factors, the court found that genuine issues of
fact existed precluding a denial of the fair use defense as a matter of law.20 8
Importantly, the court noted that differences existed between the ISP in
Netcom and the BBSs in both Frena and MAPHIA.20 9 Specifically, the
court noted that the defendant ISP in Netcom did not have the same finan-
cial incentive as the defendant-BBSs in Frena and Netcom.210 When com-
bined with the factual questions raised as to the effect on any potential
market that the unique nature of the copyrighted works at issue in Netcom
might have created, 2 1' the court considered fair use a plausible argument. 212
202. See Marobie, 983 F. Supp. at 1175-76 (finding defendant Web site not entitled to fair
use defense where Web site uploaded plaintiffs copyrighted software to defendant's Web site
without plaintiffs permission).
203. See MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. at 933-36; Sabella, 1996 WL 780560, at *7-9; Frena, 839
F. Supp. at 1557-59.
204. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. F.A.C.T.NET, Inc., 901 F. Supp. 1519, 1522-26 (D. Colo.
1995); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361,
1379 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 897 F. Supp. 260, 263 (E.D. Va. 1995).
205. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1379; F.A.C.T.NET, 901 F. Supp. at 1522-26; Lerma, 897
F. Supp. at 263.
206. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1379; F.A.C.T.NET, 901 F. Supp. at 1522-26; Lenna, 897
F. Supp. at 263.
207. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1379. "Netcom's use, though commercial, also benefits the
public in allowing for the functioning of the Internet and the dissemination of other creative
works, a goal of the Copyright Act." Id. (citations omitted).
208. See id. at 1381.
209. See id.
210. See id. at 1378-79.
211. The infringing works posted to the Usenet were portions of published and unpublished
works of L. Ron Hubbard, the late founder of the Church of Scientology. See id. at 1365. The
plaintiff held the copyrights for these works. See id.
212. See id. at 1381.
(Vol. 33
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT ON THE INTERNET
Fair use does not offer clients guaranteed protection from claims of
copyright infringement in any circumstances, let alone as applied to online
service providers. Indeed, the unique circumstances and nature of the works
at issue in the Religious Technology cases arguably differentiate those cases
for purposes of fair use precedent. The Frena-Marobie-MAPHIA-Sabella
cases, on the other hand, present factual settings more representative of
many of the infringing activities occurring over the Internet. Consequently,
clients should be informed that the application of fair use is unpredictable in
all circumstances, and especially so as applied to online service providers.
V. Proposed Solutions at the National and International
Levels
The copyright laws were not specifically written to address many of
the issues presented by the Internet. Like past attempts to re-balance the
interests of copyright owners and users in response to emerging technolo-
gies, the advancing technology of the digital environment, and the Internet
in particular, has prompted both the United States Congress and interna-
tional organizations to re-evaluate current copyright law's applicability to
digital media and its success in maintaining a proper balance between au-
thors and owners of copyrights on the one hand and society's interests in
original and creative works on the other.
A. The IITF White Paper213
1. Origins, Goals and Relevance
In light of the emerging questions raised by the digital environment,
and the emerging "information infrastructure" in particular, the Clinton Ad-
ministration formed the Information Infrastructure Task Force ("IITF"). 214
The IITF's primary goal was to recommend policies promoting the devel-
oping information infrastructure. 215
213. See WHrrE PAPER, supra note 12. This report is substantially similar to the analysis and
recommendations in the Working Group on Intellectual Property's "Green Paper." INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
PRELIMINARY DRAFT (July 1994). See Pamela Samuelson, WIPO Panel Principal Paper: The U.S.
Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 369, 379 n.65 (1997) (comprehensively discussing
the United States's digital agenda at the WIPO convention in Geneva in December, 1996).
214. See Samuelson, supra note 213, at 379 (citing INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK
FORCE, THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: AGENDA FOR ACTION (Sept. 15, 1993)).
215. See id. (citing INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, NATIONAL INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRESS REPORT 1-4 (1993-94) (discussing IITF goals) [hereinafter IITF PRO-
GRESS REPORT]). Because of the emerging technology's importance to commerce, education, and
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Towards that end, the IITF created the Working Group on Intellectual
Property Rights ("Working Group"), 216 which completed the much antici-
pated "White Paper"217 in September 1995. The White Paper analyzed cur-
rent copyright laws as applied to the digital environment and suggested
changes to those laws. 218 The suggested changes were intended to reduce
the risks that the digital environment presents to copyright owners. The
Working Group believed these changes were necessary to convince copy-
right owners to make their works commercially available on digital
networks.219
While the White Paper received some favorable commentary, many
criticized the work for a variety of reasons, including its arguably "high-
protectionism" of copyright owners.220 However, because the White Paper
spurred much debate, both in the academic circles as well as in Congress,
and because it continues to be a focal point both in national and interna-
tional discussions on the future of the information infrastructure, a brief
understanding of some of its specific proposals is valuable.
2. Proposed Liability of Online Providers
The Working Group strongly believed that online service providers
should be strictly liable for infringing acts occurring on or through their
communication among the public generally, the HTF promised to be an important step towards
integrating digital media and the general public. See id.
216. See id. (citing IITF PROGRESS REPORT (discussing activities of different IITF Working
Groups). The Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks was named chair of the Working Group
on Intellectual Property Rights. See Samuelson, supra note 213, at 379.
217. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 12.
218. See Samuelson, supra note 213, at 379.
219. See id. at 379-80.
220. See Samuelson, supra note 213, at 379 n.65, 380-81 (citing Pamela Samuelson, The
Copyright Grab, WIRED, Jan. 1996, at 134). The digital agenda of the WHITE PAPER was aimed to:
(1) give copyright owners control over every use of copyrighted works in digital form
by interpreting existing law as being violated whenever users make even temporary
reproductions or works in the random access memories of their computers;
(2) give copyright owners control over every transmission of works in digital form by
amending the copyright statute so that digital transmissions will be regarded as distribu-
tions of copies to the public;
(3) eliminate fair-use rights whenever a use might be licensed ...
(4) deprive the public of the 'first sale' rights it has long enjoyed in the print world ...
because the WHITE PAPER treats electronic forwarding as a violation of both the repro-
duction and distribution rights of copyright law;
(5) attach copyright management information to digital copies of a work, ensuring that
publishers can track every use made of digital copies and trace where each copy resides
on the network and what is being done with it at any time;
(6) protect every work technologically (by encryption, for example) and make illegal
any attempt to circumvent that protection; [and]
force online service providers to become copyright police ....
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networks. 221 In rejecting arguments suggesting either exemptions from the
strict liability standard, or,, in the alternative, imposing a higher standard
less likely to relieve online providers from liability, 222 the White Paper of-
fered several legal as well as policy justifications for maintaining a strict
liability standard for online providers. 223
Importantly, the White Paper cited approvingly the Frena224 decision
for the proposition that BBSs can appropriately be held liable for direct
infringement because, as a strict liability tort, intent is not required for in-
fringement. 225 The White Paper also cited the earlier decision in Sega v.
MAPHIA226 as justification for applying both direct and contributory liabil-
ity to a BBS operator, and online service providers in general. 227 The White
Paper buttressed its opinion that online service providers could be held lia-
ble for infringements occurring on their networks by contending that: (1)
reproductions of works in the random access memory of computers were
already "reproductions" that copyright owners were entitled to control
under the Copyright Act;228 and that (2) digital transmissions should be
considered "distributions" to the public which copyright owners had the
right to exclusively control. 229 Acceptance of these two conclusions would
virtually ensure that intermediate institutions, such as online service provid-
ers, could and would be held liable for infringements occurring on their
networks.
As a matter of policy, the White Paper asserted that, as between two
relatively innocent parties-copyright owners, whose works were being in-
fringed online, and Internet Service Providers, who admittedly may encoun-
ter great difficulty in monitoring, controlling and preventing infringing
activity on their networks-the best policy is to hold the service provider
liable.230 The White Paper asserted that holding intermediate institutions-
such as online service providers-strictly liable was necessary to ensure the
sufficient protection of copyright owners' rights such that these owners
would be willing to bestow their original and creative works through the
221. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 114-24. Id. at 380-81.
222. See id.
223. See id.
224. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
225. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 118-19.
226. 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
227. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 119-24.
228. See id. at 64-66; see also Samuelson, supra note 213, at 382 n.75.
229. See WHTrrE PAPER, supra note 12, at 67-69, 213 (recommending U.S. copyright law be
amended to clarify that digital transmissions are "distributions" of copies for purposes of the
Copyright Act); Samuelson, supra note 213, at 392 n.131.
230. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 114-28, 116 ("Between these two relatively inno-
cent parties, the best policy is to hold the service provider liable.").
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online environment. 23 1 Thus, according to the White Paper, any standard
less than strict liability would reduce copyright owners' incentives to create,
thereby decreasing the availability of these works to the public. 232 This im-
balance would fail to meet the goals of copyright law.233
The digital agenda embodied in the White Paper is so controversial
that the bills introduced to implement it as law were not reported out of
subcommittee when offered to the U.S. Congress.2 34 The online service pro-
vider community could not yet rest easy, however. While this initial attempt
to legislate changes to the existing copyright laws apparently failed domes-
tically, supporters of the White Paper took their recommendations to the
international arena.2 35
B. WIP0 236 and the WIPO Copyright Treaty2 3 7
Refusing to admit defeat, proponents of the White Paper attempted to
convince the international community to include the White Paper's digital
agenda in new treaties being discussed by WIPO in Geneva in 1996.238
Indeed, the U.S. proposed that WIPO adopt a digital agenda almost identi-
231. See id. at 114-28.
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. See Samuelson, supra note 213, at 373 (citing NII Copyright Protection Act of 1995,
H.R. 2441, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 1284, 104th Cong. (1995); NIl Copyright Protection Act of
1995: Hearings on H.R. 2441 Before the Subcomm. On Courts & Intellectual Property of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996)).
235. See generally Samuelson, supra note 213, at 379 n.65 (comprehensively discussing the
United States' attempt to implement its Digital Agenda at WIPO by attempting to convince the
delegates to include the U.S. position in the new WIPO Copyright Treaty).
236. See Samuelson, supra note 213, at 369 n.l.
The World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") is a specialized agency of the
United Nations that has responsibility for, among other things, hosting discussions and
negotiations concerning international intellectual property norms.
Id. (citing Sam Ricketson, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND AR-
TISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986 (1987). See also Hayes, Tidal Wave, supra note 11, § II.A.3, at n.22
(noting that WIPO is an organization within the United Nations commissioned to address issues of
copyrights and trademarks). The final WIPO Copyright Treaty "was intended to be a 'special
agreement' (or protocol) to supplement the major international copyright treaty, known as the
Berne Convention, under article 20 of that convention." Samuelson, supra note 213, at 370 n.3
(citing Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 27, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (1986) [hereinafter Berne
Convention]).
237. WIPO Copyright Treaty, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/94 (Dec. 10, 1996).
238. See generally Samuelson, supra note 213 (comprehensively discussing the United
States's attempt to implement its Digital Agenda at WIPO by attempting to convince the delegates
to include the U.S. position in the new WIPO Copyright Treaty).
When the WHITE PAPER'S legislative package [failed domestically], Lehman's reaction
was not to reconsider what the U.S. position on these issues should be or to slow down
the treaty making process on these issues until domestic consensus could be achieved.
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cal to that embodied in the White Paper.239 The U.S. delegation failed, how-
ever, to "end-run" Congress's earlier rejection of the White Paper.240 By the
end of the WIPO discussions, none of the U.S.'s proposals as originally
developed in the White Paper had been included in the WIPO Copyright
Treaty.241
1. Proposed Article 7 Eliminated
Most significantly for online service providers, the final adopted ver-
sion of the WIPO Copyright Treaty completely eliminated a proposed arti-
cle 7.242 As originally drafted, the proposed article 7243 would not have
relieved online service providers from potential liability for copies of in-
fringing works temporarily made by the service provider's network equip-
ment as infringing works passed through those networks.244 Consistent with
the White Paper's views, 245 the initial draft article 7(1) would have adopted
the MA1246 decision, thereby granting copyright owners the right to control
temporary copies stored in a computer's memory. 247 Draft article 7(2)248
Rather, his response was to redouble efforts... [attempting to] get in Geneva an imple-
mentation of the digital agenda that he had not yet been able to get from Congress.
Id. at 429.
239. See Samuelson, supra note 213, at 372-73, 380-81 "The only new element in the U.S.
digital agenda at WIPO as compared with the digital agenda reflected in the White Paper, was a
late-added proposal by the U.S. delegation calling for a treaty to create a new form of legal
protection for the contents of databases." Id. (citing Proposal of the United States of America on
sui generis Protection of Databases, WIPO Doc. BCP/CEIVII/2-INRVI/2 (May 20, 1996)).
240. See Samuelson, supra note 213, at 434-39.
241. See id.
242. See id. at 390 ("The WIPO Copyright Treaty ... contains no provision on temporary
copying."); Hayes, Tidal Wave, supra note 11, § II.A.3.(a) ("The proposed Article 7 was ulti-
mately simply deleted entirely from the adopted version of the treaty.").
243. As originally proposed, article 7(1) of the draft copyright treaty provided:
The exclusive fight accorded to authors of literary and artistic works in Article 9(1) of
the Berne Convention of authorizing the reproduction of their works shall include direct
and indirect reproduction of their works, whether permanent or temporary, in any man-
ner or form.
Basic Proposalfor the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty on Certain Questions Concerning the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works to Be Considered by the Diplomatic Conference on
Certain Copyright and Neighboring Rights Questions, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/4 (Aug. 30, 1996)
[hereinafter WIPO Draft Copyright Treaty]. See Samuelson, supra note 213, at 384.
244. See Samuelson, supra note 213, at 384-85.
245. See id. at 382-83; WHirE PAPER, supra note 12, at 64-66.
246. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
247. See Samuelson, supra note 213, at 382-83, 384-92; WHrrE PAPER, supra note 12, at
64-66.
248. Draft article 7(2) stated:
Subject to the provisions of article 9(2) of the Berne Convention, it shall be a matter for
legislation in Contracting Parties to limit the right of reproduction in cases where a
temporary reproduction has the sole purpose of making the work perceptible or where
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was included to limit the potential overbreadth of draft article 7(1).249 Draft
article 7(2) would have allowed the Contracting Parties250 to limit the right
of reproduction in defined circumstances. 25' The combined effect of the
proposed article 7 would have enabled Contracting Parties to exempt from
infringement the making of temporary copies necessary to view content on
the Internet.252 Because draft article 7(2) would not have allowed Con-
tracting Parties to exempt from infringement the temporary copies made by
a service provider's server computers, 253 and because of the breadth of draft
article 7(1),254 service providers lobbied against the article. 255
However, while the WIPO Copyright Treaty does not contain any pro-
vision concerning temporary copies,256 service providers still cannot be as-
sured that they will not be held liable for infringing activity occurring on
their networks. While article 7 was deleted, at the last minute, the U.S.
delegation at WIPO proposed an "Agreed Statement" interpreting the state
of digital reproductions. 257 The effect of the ultimately adopted Agreed
the reproduction is of transient or incidental nature, provided that such reproduction
takes place in the course of use of the work that is authorized by the author or permitted
by law.
WIPO Draft Copyright Treaty, supra note 243, art. 7(2); see Samuelson, supra note 213, at
384-85.
249. See Samuelson, supra note 213, at 384-92.
250. "Contracting Parties" are the signatory members to the WIPO Copyright Treaty. See
Hayes, Tidal Wave, supra note 11, § II.A.3.(a).
251. See Samuelson, supra note 213, at 384-85; Hayes, Tidal Wave, supra note 11,
§ II.A.3.(a).
252. See Samuelson, supra note 213, at 385.
253. See id. "[Article 7(2)] was sufficiently narrowly drawn that it would not, for example,
have relieved telephone companies or online service providers from potential liability for tempo-
rary copies of infringing material made in company equipment as the material passed through
their systems en route from sender to recipient." Id.; accord Hayes, Tidal Wave, supra note 11,
§ II.A.1.
254. See Samuelson, supra note 213, at 384-85.
255. See id. at 384-87.
256. See id. at 390 ("The WIPO Copyright Treaty ... contains no provision on temporary
copying.").
257. See id. at 390-92. The adopted version states:
The reproduction right, as set out in article 9 of the Berne Convention, and the excep-
tions permitted, thereunder, fully apply in the digital environment, in particular to the
sue of works in digital form.
See id. at 390 n.121 (citing Agreed Statements Concerning the WIPO Copyright Treaty, WIPO
Doc. CRNR/DC/96 (Dec. 20, 1996) [hereinafter Agreed Statements]). Article 9(2) of the Berne
Convention provides:
It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to permit the reproduc-
tion of such works in certain special cases, provided that such reproduction does not
conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the author.
Berne Convention, supra note 236, art. 9(2). Two of the three proposed sentences were passed.
The deleted sentence would have stated that uploading and downloading of works by computers
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Statement is to leave unanswered the question of whether temporary images
stored in a computer's RAM infringes a copyright owner's right of repro-
duction.258 Consequently, whether interim, temporary copies made during
the course of transmission on a service provider's equipment are infringe-
ments of the copyright owner's reproduction right under the WIPO Copy-
right Treaty is similarly unclear.259
In sum, the international arena is likely to experience the same uncer-
tainty experienced in U.S. courts as to whether online service providers can
be held liable for infringing the right of reproduction of copyright owners
when third parties use the service provider's networks to engage in infring-
ing activities.260 The liability of these service providers may depend on the
implementing legislation enacted in each country.
26 1
2. Article 8262
Online service providers also expressed concern over the adoption of
draft article 8,263 which granted copyright owners the exclusive right of
authorizing any communication to the public of their works.264 Online ser-
vice providers were concerned that the exclusive right of communication
would impose liability on the service providers because they arguably com-
were reproductions within the meaning of the Berne Convention. See Samuelson, supra note 213,
at 391.
258. See Hayes, Tidal Wave, supra note 11, § H.A.3.(a) ("[T]he Agreed Statement seems to
leave virtually open ended the question of whether temporary images in RAM will be treated as
falling within the copyright owner's right of reproduction."); Samuelson, supra note 213, at
390-92.
259. See Hayes, Tidal Wave, supra note 11, § II.A.3.(a) ("[W]hether interim copies made
during the course of transmission constitute infringement may turn on the countries through which
the transmission path passes, which is arbitrary under the current transmission technology of the
Internet.").
260. See id.
261. See id.
262. See WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 237, art. 8. The adopted WIPO Copyright
Treaty Article 8 reads in relevant part:
authors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing any
communication to the public of their works, by wire or wireless means, including the
making available to the public of their works in such a way that members of the public
may access these works from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.
Id.
263. See Samuelson, supra note 213, at 397 n.156. "Telephone companies and online service
providers had many of the same concerns about the draft treaty provision on the communication
right as they had about the draft treaty provision on temporary copying." Id. (citing Ad Hoc
Alliance for a Digital Future, Suggested Revisions to the Chairman's Basic Proposal of the Treaty
Formerly Known as the Berne Protocol 1-2, (Oct. 31, 1996) <http://www.ari.net/dfc/intlU
euahl.html> ("calling for a narrowing of draft article 10 so that merely providing facilities for
transmission should not make a firm liable for infringement").
264. See WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 237, art. 8.
Fall 1998]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
municated authors' protected works to the public when users of their serv-
ices engaged the service providers' computers to transmit infringing
works.2 65 In response to this concern, delegates adopted another agreed
statement interpreting article 8 to mean that providing services enabling the
transmission of digital works was not intended to be construed as a commu-
nication to the public. 266
The result of the adoption of article 8 in the final treaty, therefore, was
to substantially alleviate the fears of online service providers. 267 When con-
sidered in light of the deletion of article 7,268 the risk of being held liable
for infringing activity occurring on their networks had not been increased
by WIPO.
3. The Reach of the WIPO Copyright Treaty
While the WIPO Copyright Treaty did not eliminate the concerns
raised by domestic court decisions as to online service providers' liability
for copyright infringement,2 69 the WIPO treaty did not adopt the White Pa-
per's position that online service providers should be liable for infringing
activity occurring on their networks. 270 Rather, WIPO arguably changed
very little the law as developed by U.S. courts with respect to liability for
copyright infringement of online services.271
Significantly, even though the WIPO treaty does not contain any of the
U.S. delegation's proposals as originally offered, the treaty does reflect the
265. See Samuelson, supra note 213, at 397 ("Under one interpretation, these firms could be
viewed as communicating protected works to the public whenever they provided users with facili-
ties for transmitting works.").
266. See id. ("[D]elegates to the diplomatic conference adopted an agreed-upon statement of
interpretation to the WIPO Copyright Treaty which said that merely providing services for trans-
mission of digital works should not be construed as a communication to the public.").
267. See id. "[Article 8 and the accompanying agreed-upon statement], along with the omis-
sion of article 7 from the final treaty, meant that telephone companies and online service providers
could finally breathe easily about the copyright treaty that would emanate from Geneva." Id.
(citations omitted).
268. See id.
269. See discussion supra Part III.
270. See Samuelson, supra note 213, at 434-39 (noting that the United States arguably exper-
ienced mixed success in promoting its Digital Agenda at WIPO).
271. See id.
Insofar as the original draft of article 7 would have made [online] service providers and
other intermediate institutions liable for all user infringements, including those of which
they knew nothing, the treaty's rejection of article 7 is consistent with U.S. caselaw.
[Additionally], U.S. copyright law has long accorded copyright owners the right to
transmit their works to the public. Hence, the treaty's endorsement of treating digital
transmissions as communications to the public is consistent with U.S. copyright law.
Id. at 436. (citing Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F.
Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Sega Enters. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996)).
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goals of U.S. copyright law. Indeed, the WIPO treaty clearly attempts to
balance the interests of copyright owners on the one hand, against the inter-
ests of society in original and creative works on the other.
272
C. Proposed and Pending Legislative Changes in the United States
In the past two years, four bills have been introduced in Congress that
propose significant legislative changes in the copyright laws and conse-
quently would affect the liability of online service providers. These bills
vary as to exactly when an OSP would be liable for infringing acts taking
place on their networks.
1. H.R. 2180273
Introduced in 1997 by Representative Howard Coble (R-N.C.), H.R.
2180 attempted to clarify the circumstances under which OSPs may be held
liable for infringements occurring on their networks, but which other parties
directly committed. The legislation would have added a new section 512 to
the current 1976 Act specifically limiting liability of OSPs.
2 74
H.R. 2180 would have exempted a person who solely transmitted or
otherwise provided access to material online from liability for direct copy-
right infringement or vicarious liability for the infringing acts of another, if
the person did not: (1) initially place the material online; (2) generate, select
or alter the content of the material; (3) determine the recipients of the mate-
rial; (4) receive a financial benefit directly attributable to a particular act of
infringement; (5) sponsor, endorse or advertise the material; and (6) know,
and was not aware by notice or other information indicating that the mate-
rial is infringing.275 Importantly, the bill expressly stated that OSPs would
have no affirmative obligation to seek information as to whether any partic-
ular material was infringing. 276 Additionally, H.R. 2180 limited liability for
contributory infringement to injunctive relief, provided that such relief is
technically feasible and economical to carry out.277
272. See id. at 375. "[The WIPO Copyright Treaty reflects] an approach that strongly resem-
bles the balancing-of-interests approach that has been traditional in U.S. copyright law. The WIPO
Copyright Treaty even affirms 'the need to maintain a balance between the interests of authors and
the larger public interest, particularly education, research and access to information."' Id. (quoting
WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 237).
273. On-Line Copyright Liability Limitation Act, H.R. 2180, 105th Cong. (1997).
274. See id. § 2.
275. See id.
276. See id.
277. See id.
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2. H.R. 3209278 / H.R. 2281279
On February 12, 1998, Representative Coble and Representative
Goodlatte (R-Va) introduced H.R. 3209, a revised version of H.R. 2180.280
On April 1, 1998, the House Judiciary Committee incorporated H.R. 3209
into H.R. 2281, the pending Digital Millennium Copyright Act.281 The
night before, however, representatives of copyright owners and online ser-
vice providers reached an agreement on draft legislation concerning online
copyright liability. 282 The agreement was similar to H.R. 3209, but differed
slightly. 283 Ultimately, H.R. 2281 was amended to include this agree-
ment.284 On October 12, 1998, an amended version of H.R. 2281 was
passed through both the House and Senate and was cleared for White House
approval '
Like its predecessor, H.R. 2281 adds a new section 512 defining the
circumstances in which OSPs would be liable for infringing activity occur-
ring on their networks.285 In short, H.R. 2281 is intended to codify the
Netcom decision discussed previously and overrule the decision in
Frena.286
Under H.R. 2281, an OSP would be exempt from liability for mone-
tary relief for direct infringement based solely on the intermediate storage
and transmission of material over the OSP's network2 87 if: (1) the transmis-
278. On-Line Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act, H.R. 3209, 105th Cong.
(1998).
279. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. (1998) (currently
awaiting White House approval).
280. See H.R. 3209, 105th Cong. (1998); see also New On-Line Copyright Infringement Bill
Represents 'Common Base,' 55 PAT. TRADEMARK COPYRIGHT 312-13 (1998) (discussing pending
legislation in Congress concerning online liability); H.R. 3209: On-Line Provider Liability, 55
PAT. TRADEMARK COPYRIGHT 369 (1998) (discussing pending bill 3209).
281. See House Judiciary Approves Copyright Reform for Digital Environment, 55 PAT.
TRADEMARK COPYRIGHT 519-20 (1998) (discussing legislative changes to H.R. 3209); WIPO
Copyright Treaties Implementation Act, H.R. 2281, 105th Cong., tit. 11 (1997). The two bills are
now collectively referred to as H.R. 2281, the "Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998." A
companion bill, S. 2037, was introduced in the Senate. S. 2037 combined S. 1121, the Senate's
bill implementing the WIPO Treaty, and the substance of the amended version of H.R. 2281. On
September 17, 1998; H.R. 2281 passed the Senate in lieu of S. 2037.
282. See Industry Groups Reach Accord On Online Copyright Liability Legislation, 55 PAT.
TRADEMARK COPYRIGHT 557-58, 564-67 (1998) (discussing new agreement). The agreement rep-
resents a settlement of disputes stalling the passage of H.R. 3209. See id.
283. See id.
284. See id.
285. Compare H.R. 3209, 105th Cong. § 2, with H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. § 202.
286. See New On-Line Copyright Infringement Bill Represents 'Common Base,' supra note
280, at 313 (noting Rep. Coble intended that H.R. 3209 overrule Frena to the extent that that case
suggests such acts could constitute direct infringement).
287. These four exceptions to liability apply to "service providers" defined for the four excep-
tions to mean "an entity offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital
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sion is initiated by another person; (2) the storage and transmission is car-
ried out through an automatic technological process without any selection
of that material by the provider; (3) any copy made of the material is not
retained longer than necessary for the purpose of carrying out that transmis-
sion; and (4) the material is transmitted through the system or network
without modification to its content.288
The bill would additionally limit a plaintiff's remedy against the OSP
to injunctive relief when the OSP:
has adopted and reasonably implemented, and informed subscribers and
account holders of the service provider's system or network of, a policy
that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of sub-
scribers and account holders of the service provider's system or network
who are repeat infringers; and accommodates and does not interfere with
standard technical measures. 289
Further, under § 512(c) of H.R. 2281, an OSP would be subject to only a
limited injunction and not be liable for monetary damages for conduct not
covered by the above circumstances when the provider: (1) does not have
actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the material on the
system or network is infringing, is not aware of facts or circumstances from
which infringing activity is apparent and upon obtaining such knowledge or
awareness acts expeditiously to disable access to the material; 290 or (2) does
not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity,
in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control
such activity; 29I and (3) upon notification of claimed infringement responds
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to
be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity. 292
online communications, between or among points specified by a user, of material of the user's
choosing, without modification to the content of the material as sent or received." H.R. 2281,
105th Cong. § 512(k)(1)(A) (1998). For all other purposes, the bill defines "service provider" to
mean "a provider of online services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefore." See
H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. § 512(k)(1)(B).
288. See H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. § 512(a).
289. Id. § 512 (i)(1)(A)-(B). "Standard technical measures" is defined as:
[those] technical measures that are used by copyright owners to identify or protect copy-
righted works and have been developed pursuant to a broad consensus of copyright
owners and service providers in an open, fair, voluntary, multi-industry standards pro-
cess, [and] are available to any person on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms and
do not impose substantial costs on service providers or substantial burdens on their
systems or networks.
Id. § 512 (i)(2)(A)-(C).
290. Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)-(iii).
291. Id. § 512(c)(1)(B).
292. Id. § 512(c)(1)(C).
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Additional provisions affect liability for (1) "caching" 293 and (2) "link-
ing"294 to infringing material. Where injunctive relief is granted, § 5120)
limits the scope of relief the court may grant.295
3. S. 1146296
S. 1146 is a counterpart bill to both H.R. 2180 and H.R. 2281.297
While S. 1146 also suggests amending the current copyright laws by adding
a § 512,298 it takes a somewhat simpler, more direct approach.
The bill would exempt any person providing "electronic communica-
tions network services or facilities" 299 for direct, contributory or vicarious
293. Id. § 512(b) (limiting the liability of OSPs to limited injunctive relief in certain defined
circumstances); see Hayes, Tidal Wave, supra note 11, § II.B, defining "caching" as:
Caching is another activity that is, under current technology, virtually ubiquitous on the
Internet. Caching (sometimes know as "mirroring," usually when it involves storage of
an entire site or other complete set of material from a source) means storing copies of
material from an original source site (such as a Web page) for later use when the same
material is requested again, thereby obviating the need to go back to the original source
for the material. The purpose of caching is to speed up repeated access to data and to
reduce network congestion resulting from repeated downloads of data. The cached ma-
terial is generally stored at a site that is geographically closer to the user, or on a more
powerful computer or one that has a less congested data path to the ultimate user. The
cached information is usually stored only temporarily, although the times may vary from
a few seconds to a few days, weeks, or more.
Id.
294. "Linking" or "hypertext linking" refers generally to the process by which a computer
user or browser clicks with a mouse on highlighted text on a Web page, which causes the browser
to be transported through cyberspace to a new location on the Internet, often on an entirely differ-
ent Web page. See H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. § 512(d) (limiting the liability of OSPs to limited
injunctive relief in certain defined circumstances).
295. See H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. § 512(i). While H.R. 2281 divides the scope of relief a court
may grant depending on the service provider's actions, the bill basically limits a court's injunctive
relief to: (i) an order restraining the service provider from providing access to infringing material
or activity residing at a particular online site on the provider's system or network; or (ii) an order
restraining the service provider from providing access to a subscriber or account holder of the
service provider's system or network who is engaging in infringing activity and is identified in the
order, by terminating the accounts of the subscriber or account holder that are specified in the
order, or (iii) such other injunctive relief as the court may consider necessary to prevent or restrain
infringement of copyrighted material specified in the order; of the court at a particular online
location, if such relief is the least burdensome to the service provider among the forms of relief
comparably effective for that purpose. See id. § 512(j)(1)(A)(i)-(iii), (B).
296. Digital Copyright Clarification and Technology Education Act of 1997, S. 1146, 105th
Cong. (1997). The bill was introduced in September 1997 by Senator John Ashcroft (R-Mo). See
New On-Line Copyright Infringement Bill Represents 'Common Base,' supra note 280, at 313.
297. See New On-Line Copyright Infringement Bill Represents 'Common Base,' supra note
280, at 313 (noting that S. 1146 is a counterpart to both H.R. 2180 and H.R. 3209); H.R. 3209:
On-Line Provider Liability, supra note 284, at 369 (noting that S. 1146 is a counterpart to both
H.R. 2180 and H.R. 3209).
298. See S. 1146, 105th Cong. § 102.
299. Id.
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liability from any copyright infringement arising out of the provision of
those services and which infringement was caused by a user of those serv-
ices. 300 Consequently, under S. 1146, an OSP will only be liable if it has
failed to remove the infringing works after receiving notice of the infringing
activity from the copyright holder.30'
In sum, the legislative changes at both the national and international
levels are beginning to attempt to resolve the many copyright issues
presented in the online context. The legislation just passed in Congress and
expected to be signed into law by President Clinton, would significantly
alter the liabilities of OSPs under U.S. copyright law. How those changes
will be affected by international agreements on the subject is uncertain. 30 2
In the end, and similar to its past reactions to technological advancements,
H.R. 2281 is another example of Congress's efforts to maintain the proper
balance between copyright owners and society's interest.
VI. The Applicability of the Current Law and Proposed
Solutions to Specific Parties Operating on the
Internet
In addition to understanding the liability of OSPs in terms of legal
categories, a copyright attorney should also find useful an analysis of the
liability of OSPs dissected by the particular type of Internet activity in
which it is engaged. Thus, the analysis that follows synthesizes OSP's risks
of liability in relation to that OSP's particular type of Internet operation.
The analysis includes both a summary of the risks of liability of the particu-
lar type of OSP under current case law as well as the liability that the partic-
ular type of OSP can expect in the future, given the current proposed and
pending changes to national and international copyright laws.
A. Internet Service Providers
1. Operations Providing Only Access to the Internet
Parties who purely provide access to the Internet, and nothing more,
have the best chance of avoiding liability for copyright infringement. These
operations operate truly automatically, and therefore seemingly do not act
300. See id.
301. See id.; see also New On-Line Copyright Infringement Bill Represents 'Common Base,'
supra note 280, at 313 (discussing S. 1146).
302. To be effective in the United States, the Senate must ratify implementing legislation. As
discussed above, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act incorporates the necessary implementing
legislation. However, future international agreements may require future amendments to U.S.
copyright law. See WIPO Copyright and Performances and Phonograms Treaty Implementation
Act of 1997, S. 1121, 105th Cong. (1997); WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act, H.R.
2281, 105th Cong. (1997).
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with the requisite volition the current trend in case law requires for a find-
ing of direct infringement. 303 Further, pure access providers arguably offer a
service promoting the underlying goals of copyright law.30 4 Access provid-
ers promote an incredible dissemination of information to the public, thus
benefiting the overall welfare of society. 305 Consequently, access providers
may also be the only one of the three types of Internet operations capable of
successfully claiming the fair use defense. 306
Contributory liability offers the greatest risk of liability for access
providers. Under current case law, an access provider will likely be found
to have had the requisite knowledge of infringing activity by virtue of the
existence of copyright notices on posted infringing pictures. 307 Addition-
ally, the access provider will likely have been deemed to have substantially
participated in the infringing activity by virtue of providing the network
facilities. 308
Pending legislation in Congress, however, appears likely to offer ex-
emptions from liability for access providers. At least one proposed bill
would apparently alleviate liability of access providers based on knowledge
of the infringing activity by specifically exempting OSPs from requiring
that they affirmatively determine whether any materials on their networks
are infringing. 309 This change would alter current case law on the point.31o
Another pending bill would simply appear to eliminate liability of OSPs
altogether absent a failure to remove an infringing work after notifica-
tion.31' Like issues faced in the courts, however, this bill does not identify
what constitutes "sufficient notice." 312
Similarly, current case law offers substantial risks as to vicarious lia-
bility even for pure access providers. 313 Pending legislation, however,
would substantially limit vicarious liability. 314
303. See discussion supra Part I.A.
304. See discussion supra Part I.A.
305. See discussion supra Part I.B.
306. See discussion supra Part IV.
307. See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
308. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
309. See H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. § 512(l)(1) (1998) (noting that liability is not premised upon
"a service provider monitoring its service or affirmatively seeking facts indicating infringing ac-
tivity, except to the extent consistent with a standard technical measure complying with subsection
(i)." See discussion of H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. § 512(l)(1)(i) supra note 281.
310. See discussion supra Part III.B. I (discussing effect of Netcom on knowledge element of
contributory liability).
311. See Digital Copyright Clarification and Technology Education Act of 1997, S. 1146,
105th Cong. § 101(5).
312. See id.; supra Part III.B.1.
313. See discussion supra Part III.C.
314. See discussion supra Part V.C.
[Vol. 33
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT ON THE INTERNET
In sum, even operations that only provide access to the Internet are
currently at high risk of being held liable for copyright infringement occur-
ring on their networks. While pending legislation offers hopeful exemptions
to this liability, the substantial discussion of OSP liability at WIPO, 3 15 com-
bined with the adopted agreed statement as well as the White Paper's argua-
bly protectionist agenda, 316 indicates that provisions imposing liability on
OSPs for direct infringement may be adopted by the international commu-
nity in the future.
2. Operations Providing Both Access and Content
Operations that provide both access to the Internet and content once on
the Internet are at greater risk than those operations simply providing ac-
cess. In addition to the risks noted above regarding pure access providers,
parties that also provide content incur additional risks for several reasons.
Depending on the way the content is provided, a court is more likely to
find a party providing content in which infringing works are found to have a
more direct involvement in presenting the infringing material. 317 Thus, a
finding of direct infringement is more likely against Internet operations pro-
viding content than for those operations providing only access.318
Additionally, liability for contributory infringement is more likely.
Parties offering users content are more likely to at least have constructive
knowledge of the content that they are providing users. Further, if the OSP
is promoting its services based on the content it is offering, not only will
this implicate a greater level of knowledge of their offerings, but will also
imply a certain level of control in selecting, or at least generating, the in-
fringing material.
Liability for contributory infringement will depend heavily on the leg-
islation ultimately adopted. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act-re-
cently signed by the President-limits the remedy for contributory
infringement to limited injunctive relief. The courts must still determine
when a party is contributorily liable.319
OSPs that provide content in addition to access have the added disad-
vantage of inherently maintaining greater control over the infringing activi-
ties. Thus, an OSP providing both access and content runs a greater risk of
being held vicariously liable for infringing activity occurring on or through
315. See discussion supra Part V.B.
316. See discussion supra Part V.A.
317. See supra notes 117-23 and accompanying text (discussing the Webbworld cases direct
infringement).
318. See supra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
319. See H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. § 512(c)(1)(a)(i)-(iii) (1998).
Fall 19981
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
its networks. The OSP will certainly be deemed to maintain the ultimate
control over what content it is providing to users. Additionally, the increas-
ing commercial nature of the Internet presents an increased likelihood that
courts will hold-especially after Fonovisa-that any party providing con-
tent receives a direct financial benefit from the infringing activity.320 Thus,
courts are likely to find that the infringing material provided by the OSP
enhances the value of their site to consumers. 321 This increased risk is espe-
cially likely given consumers' wide understanding that the Internet offers
many works "for free" for which the consumer would otherwise have to
pay.322 Thus, parties providing content are more likely to be considered by
the courts closer to "dance-hall operators" than "landlords." 32 3 While pas-
sage of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act will limit the remedy for
vicarious liability, H.R. 2281 does nothing to aid the courts in determining
exactly when a party is vicariously liable.324
Finally, the policy considerations underlying the copyright laws do not
weigh as heavily in favor of parties providing content as they do for parties
providing purely access to the Internet. Pure access providers promote the
dissemination of original and creative works in a manner that is arguably
appropriate when balanced against any harm to copyright owners. However,
the commercial nature of the Internet has led many parties also providing
content to offer that content for self-interested, often financial reasons. 32 5
Such commercialism of the Internet may tip the balance of interests be-
tween authors and society against these authors. The different approaches
taken by the pending legislation reflect this concern. In sum, providing any
form of content likely increases a party's risks of liability for copyright
infringement, both in the present and the future.
320. See discussion supra Part IlI.CI.
321. See discussion supra Part III.C. I (discussing Webbworld cases). Cf Marobie-FL, Inc. v.
National Ass'n of Fire Equip. Distribs. & N.W. Nexus, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 1167, 1179 (N.D. Ill.
1997) (finding issues of material fact precluded plaintiffs motion for summary judgment request-
ing the court hold an Internet Service Provider contributorily liable who stored co-defendant's
Web page on its server).
322. See Jason Chervokas, Internet CD Copying Tests Music Industry, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 6,
1998, at D3 (noting consumers knowledge of "underground" networks providing infringing
materials).
323. See discussion supra Part II.C (discussing generally the doctrine of vicarious liability).
324. See H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. § 512(c)(1)(B) (1998).
325. Of course, many sites on the Internet may be operated purely out of a desire to dissemi-
nate information, without the operators seeking or receiving any compensation or advertising rev-
enues for doing so.
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B. Bulletin Board Operators
The courts have treated operators of BBSs virtually identically to pure
access providers. 326 Apparently, few technical differences with legal signifi-
cance exist between access providers and BBSs. Importantly, however, de-
pending on judicial or technical interpretation, BBSs may not be exempt
from liability for direct infringement 327 but, nonetheless, would be exempt
from liability for caching, 328 vicarious 329 and contributory 330 liability and
liability related to linking. 331 Thus, depending upon courts' determinations,
BBSs may be subject to a greater risk of liability for direct infringement
than Internet access providers. However, as noted above, BBSs, like access
providers, still operate with significant risk of incurring liability for copy-
right infringement occurring on their networks, especially given their appar-
ent exposure to liability for direct infringement as a result of H.R. 2281.
C. Web Site Operators and Content Only Providers
Web site operators and operations that provide only content maintain
the greatest risk of being held liable for copyright infringement. Depending
on exactly how the operation is set up, Web site operators and pure content
providers arguably satisfy the elements of all three theories of liability for
copyright infringement.332 Even if a court were to deny liability based on
direct infringement, the knowledge and contribution to the infringing activ-
ity most certainly would lead to a finding of contributory liability. Indeed,
these parties come the closest to common situations of copyright infringe-
ment occurring outside the digital environment (i.e. like the "traditional"
direct infringement of reproducing a picture in a book without permission
of the owner). The only difference in many of these Internet operations is
that the infringements are occurring in digital form rather than in a tangible
medium.
These Internet operations will be virtually unaffected by any pending
legislation in Congress. 333 Additionally, in light of the aggressive approach
taken by the United States at the WIPO convention in Geneva,334 and in the
326. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs. Inc., 907 F.
Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (analyzing ISP and BBS similarly for purposes of liability for copy-
right infringement).
327. See H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. § 512(a).
328. See id. § 512(b).
329. See id. § 512(c)(1)(B).
330. See id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)-(iii).
331. See id. § 512(d).
332. See discussion supra Parts II and III.
333. No apparent exemption exists in H.R. 2281. See discussion supra Part V.C.
334. See discussion supra Part V.B.
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Clinton Administration's White Paper,335 as well as in the articles for the
WIPO Copyright Treaty, 336 the international community does not appear
ready to exempt Web sites and pure content providers from liability any-
time soon. Indeed, the debate over how to legislate online liability to prop-
erly achieve copyright's goals appears to be centered on how to not exempt
parties like Web site operators and content providers while leaving room to
exempt other parties (such as access providers).
In sum, Web site operators and content providers can expect to be held
liable under at least one, if not all three theories imposing liability for copy-
right infringement. This is true under current case law and will continue to
be true under any of the currently proposed legislative changes.
Conclusion
Whether representing a copyright owner or an accused copyright in-
fringer, every attorney should understand the power of copyright law for
protecting a client's intellectual property on the Internet. Indeed, almost
every client is likely to either maintain some Internet operation or have a
proprietary interest in material already uploaded or likely to be uploaded to
the Internet.
Unfortunately for all of these clients, the rights of the respective par-
ties are relatively uncertain. While the courts are beginning to develop a
body of case law, the decisions have been far from consistent, and have not
always been entirely coherent. Future legislative changes to the copyright
laws by the United States Congress attempting to solve many of these un-
certainties appear virtually certain. Discussion at the international level is
also likely to continue. However, whether these changes achieve any real
certainty remains to be seen.
Most valuable to the client, however, is an understanding of the risks
of liability of particular Internet operations and the potential rights of par-
ties with proprietary interests in works on the Internet. While this article
analyzes current law and the effects of likely changes to it, the copyright
attorney should understand that the law will continue to develop as the tech-
nology of the Internet changes. Understanding the underlying issues that the
Internet presents for copyright law, however, will aid attorneys in advising
clients how best to maximize their rights and minimize their risks.
335. See discussion supra Part V.A.
336. See discussion supra Part V.B.
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